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1 
THE INTEGRATION OF PRIVATE CERTIFICATION IN 
GOVERNMENTAL FOOD CONTROLS 
 
SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY RESULTS 
 
Modern food governance is increasingly hybrid, involving not only government, but 
also industry and – to a lesser extent- civil society actors. In recent years we have 
observed new emerging relationships between public enforcement authorities and 
private food safety assurance schemes.  
The Survey 
A web based global survey of national governmental authorities responsible for food 
safety controls was carried out to get an overview of their collaboration with private 
assurance schemes. Summer 2017, the survey was distributed among officers 
working at national food authorities:  
1) participants of the G2G meetings of governmental food authorities discussing the 
cooperation with private food assurance systems,  
2) members of the Heads of European Food Safety Agencies, and  
3) attendants at the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme Codex Alimentarius 
Commission meeting 17-22 July 2017 where regulatory approaches to third party 
certification in food safety were discussed.  
The survey consists of a combination of questions with pre-fixed answers and open-
ended questions. The information from the questionnaire has been supplemented 
with information from the website of the organizations, other available documents 
and personnel communications via e-mail or face-to-face. 
The Response 
The survey revealed information from 41 countries (52 respondents). Not surprising-
ly, more than half are European countries. Non-European and non-OECD countries 
are underrepresented. Also three international organisations involved in technical 
capacity building and assisting governments in modernizing food safety regulation, 
responded. 
Most respondents are senior officers working at the national Ministry of Health, the 
national Ministry of Agriculture or the national food safety agency. The majority of 
the respondents have a chemical, technical or veterinary background and have been 
working for more than 10 years in the field of food safety. Six out of ten respondents 
participated in an international meeting discussing the cooperation of public agencies 
with third party assurance schemes. 
Use of Private Food Safety Assurance Schemes 
 According to the respondents, food authorities in 13 countries take private food 
safety assurance schemes into account in their inspection policy, 5 countries consider 
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2 
to  do so in the future, 27 do not. The most important reasons to (consider to) take 
private assurance schemes into account are that it contributes to compliance with 
regulations, that it implies efficient and effective use of public budget, and that 
unnecessary duplication of controls is avoided. Several respondents argue that public 
authorities do not have the capacity to perform frequent controls of all businesses 
that produce and trade food. Additional private controls can fill this gap. Public 
controls will then be able to focus the limited resources on areas with higher risk. It 
is stressed that private controls do not make governmental oversight redundant. 
Arguments Pro and Con 
Most respondents see advantages of cooperation with private certification systems. 
The main advantages are twofold.  
• Private audits are a welcome addition to the inspection capacity of public food 
agencies. They allow public authorities to focus their limited resources on the 
highest risks. 
• Cooperation with private assurance systems is expected to result in an overall 
improvement of food hygiene and it assists food businesses in complying with 
the law. So it contributes to the ultimate goal of public food safety regulation. 
 
Although almost all respondents see advantages, they also see disadvantages or risks. 
Many respondents fear that integration of private systems may put consumer 
confidence in governmental safeguarding of food safety at risk. Respondents feel that 
it is difficult to explain to consumers and even to their government, why cooperation 
with private systems is beneficial. Government will be held accountable. Closely 
connected to this is the risk of regulatory capture.  
Other risks are related to the performance of private systems: confidentiality of audit 
reports, focus on their own economic interests and unreliability of private systems. 
Some respondents mention differences between official controls and private systems 
in their purpose, focus and approach. 
Finally, according to several respondents cooperation with private systems is 
conflicting with legal obligations. 
Forms of Collaboration 
Countries that cooperate with private control systems differ in the type of 
organization they chose as primary collaboration partners. A (national) food authority 
can collaborate with food safety scheme owners, with certification bodies and 
auditors, and with food businesses. There are three forms of cooperation. 
1. The most basic form is to take participate in a private assurance scheme into 
account when inspecting a food business. Inspectors take into account all kinds 
of data including the results of private audits. This may result in a reduced 
inspection frequency or scope. This form of cooperation does not necessarily 
imply a collaborative relationship with private scheme owners or certification 
bodies. Examples include Finland and Denmark. 
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2. The competent authority assesses and recognizes certification bodies or auditors 
to perform specific audits. Food business operators can choose between a 
recognized private auditor and a public auditor. The auditor validates the food 
safety management system or verifies compliance with the (governmental) rules. 
Examples include Belgium and New Zealand. 
3. The third option is to collaborate on the level of the food certification scheme. 
The public authority recognizes  private assurance schemes after assessing its 
scope and reliability. Examples of this approach include Canada, Netherlands, 
UK, France, and Egypt. 
Assessment of Private Assurance Schemes 
Six countries are involved in assessing the scope and reliability of private assurance 
schemes. In five other countries the assessment of private assurance schemes is still 
in development The assessment of a system is generally organized in the following 
successive steps: 
1. Comparison of the scope and substantial norms of the scheme with the public 
standards and checks on formal requirements (such as accreditation under the 
international accreditation framework and adequacy of the oversight system) 
2. The competent authority tests the performance of the private system (records, 
witness audits, comparing audit reports and so on) 
3. Negotiating and agreeing on terms of cooperation: sharing of information, tasks 
and duties of the parties, terms for ending and so on. Signing of a Memorandum 
of Understanding or contract with a recognized assurance scheme. 
Private assurance schemes that are taken into account 
In what way do the organizations in their inspections consider the participation of a 
food operator in a (recognized) private assurance scheme? Often it will result in a 
reduced inspection frequency. Also the use of private audit data for public inspection 
and an adapted scope of inspection are ways to take a private assurance scheme into 
account in inspection policy.  
Respondents were asked which private assurance system they take into account. 
Food safety schemes recognized by GFSI, and (national) assurance schemes from 
industry associations and for good agricultural practice were most mentioned. The 
private schemes that are taken into account cover a wide variety of industries 
including dairy, fresh red meat, poultry, fish, eggs, fresh vegetables and fruits, dry 
groceries, cereals, ready to eat food, and feed.  
Assessment and Monitoring of Certification Bodies 
Authorities in ten countries are involved in assessing or controlling certification 
bodies. In four countries this is in development. In most countries this assessment is 
limited to the certification of organic farming. Other countries explicitly do not access 
certification bodies, either because this is regarded the responsibility of accreditation 
bodies or because assessing all certification bodies would be too burdensome. 
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In countries such as Belgium, New Zealand and the United States, certification 
bodies/auditors can apply for recognition to perform specific functions. Require-
ments for recognition often include the qualifications of the auditors, accreditation, 
impartiality and independence, reporting of audit results and (major) non-
conformities. Recognized certification bodies or auditors are qualified to conduct 
certain food safety audits verifying compliance with governmental safety regulations. 
Exchange of Information 
The confidentiality of audit reports is often mentioned as obstacle to the 
collaboration of public food authorities with private assurance schemes. Do private 
assurance schemes and public food authorities share information with each other? 
Respondents from six countries indicated that private assurance schemes shared 
information with their organization, in seven countries this is in development. 
Organizations in five countries share some information with private assurance 
schemes, in five other countries this is still in development. One of the obstacles to 
sharing information is that information about audits and inspections is confidential. 
Opinions about Private Assurance Schemes  
Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with 13 items intended to 
measure the opinion of the respondent on private assurance schemes. Most 
respondents showed a neutral or positive attitude towards private assurance 
schemes. One third of the respondents had a positive opinion. Surprisingly, none of 
the respondents showed a negative attitude. Most respondents agreed that 
accredited third part certification against a food safety standard contributes to an 
improved level of food safety. Respondents from organizations that do take private 
assurance schemes into account have a slightly more positive attitude towards 
private assurance schemes. However, the difference is only small. 
Asked about the ideal situation regarding the involvement of private assurance 
schemes in public food safety control, many respondents stress that private 
assurance should be complimentary to official controls, that responsibilities of the 
parties should be clear, that a legal base is needed, that private schemes should align 
with legislation, and a certificate should include conformity to food safety legislation 
(or all food legislation). It is also mentioned that participation in a private assurance 
scheme should not be mandatory, and that sharing information is important. 
Acquaintance with GFSI and GFSI Recognized Schemes 
Almost all respondents have heard of the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). This is 
of course not surprising, as many respondents were invited to participate in the 
survey because they have attended a G2G meeting connected to a global conference 
of GFSI. The awareness of food safety certification programs varies from fairly familiar 
(BRC, GlobalGap, FSSC22000, IFS) to virtually unknown (RiskPlaza). 
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Challenges and Points for Discussion 
Finally, what are the consequences of incorporating private controls in governmental 
monitoring and enforcement policy? The integration of private certification in official 
controls could be a win-win situation for both parties as it adds up the capacities of 
both systems. Both public food agencies and private food programs could very well 
use the resources available to the other party. However, there are some potential 
risks. From a public interest perspective, the risks can be roughly divided into four 
categories: conflicts of interest, the capacity of private actors to perform adequate 
controls, the willingness of private actors to adequate control, and regulatory 
capture. Arguably, the role of public authorities will shift from direct inspections 
towards system controls and meta regulation. This may have an impact on the 
accountability and legitimacy of governmental food authorities. 

  
7 
THE INTEGRATION OF PRIVATE CERTIFICATION IN 
GOVERNMENTAL FOOD CONTROLS 
A Survey on Public-Private Collaboration in Food Safety Governance 
 
Tetty Havinga* 
 
1. Introduction 
Food governance is characterized by multiple regulatory arrangements involving 
multiple public and private actors at multiple levels. Paradoxically, governments are 
on the one hand confronted with rising expectations and demands regarding the 
safety, quality, and reliability of food products on markets. Yet on the other hand, the 
powers of national governments to protect citizens have decreased because of the 
globalization of food chains, invisibility of risks, and political pressure to reorganize 
and slim down inspection organizations. The high expectations for public food 
authorities and their limited possibilities to be in full control, lead to the need for 
public actors to rely also on private food regulation and inspection. 
Since the 1990s we see a rapid expansion of private food safety schemes and 
standards. A private food safety standard is a set of rules or norms developed by 
private actors, such as food manufacturers, farmers, retailers, industry associations, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and food service providers. These norms 
set minimum requirements for products, processes or producers to assure that food 
is safe. The concept of private scheme usually refers to a private standard and its 
internal governance structure and procedures for conformity assessment and 
enforcement. Thus a scheme consists of not just the substantial safety norms and 
requirements (standard) but includes also a management structure and auditing 
protocol. Verification of compliance is often delegated to certification bodies, 
organisations specialized in auditing and verifying compliance. For this reason food 
safety schemes are also called third party certification schemes or programs. 
Alternative names that are used are: private assurance schemes, private certification 
schemes, private quality systems and private sector food safety standards schemes. 
In this report the term private assurance scheme is used to refer to all these private 
sector systems. 
Until recently, there were more or less two separate systems operating next to 
each other: a public control system and a private control system. In recent years we 
observe new emerging relationships between public enforcement authorities and 
private organizations. This includes public recognition of private norms and control 
systems, inclusion of public prescriptions in private food schemes and controls, and 
agreements between the public authority and private firms or sectors of industry 
regulating reciprocal obligations with respect to compliance and monitoring and 
                                                     
*  Tetty Havinga is Associate Professor Sociology of Law at the Law Faculty of the Radboud 
University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
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enforcing compliance. The past decade the industry-led Global Food Safety Initiative 
(GFSI) campaigned for governmental recognition of third party certification schemes. 
At the same time, public food authorities in countries such as the Netherlands, 
Canada and the United Kingdom explored the possibilities of enrolling private food 
safety assurance schemes in their risk-based monitoring and enforcement policies to 
economize on official inspection costs and to strengthen food safety in the food 
industry (Havinga & Verbruggen 2017, Verbruggen & Havinga 2015, 2018). In 2014, 
the Heads of European Food Safety Agencies (HoA) formed a working group to discuss 
common principles for the use of private assurance schemes in official supervision 
policy. The position of HoA is that private systems can support official controls, but 
cannot replace them. In 2016, 2017 and 2018, representatives of food authorities 
from countries all over the world have met to discuss cooperation with private 
assurance systems between themselves and with the Board of the Global Food Safety 
Initiative. In this paper I will discuss if and how national competent food authorities 
use information from private assurance schemes, why they collaborate with private 
systems, and the expected advantages and risks of this forms of collaboration. 
2. Methodology 
The aim of this research is to make an inventory of existing forms of cooperation of 
national governmental authorities responsible for food safety controls with private 
food safety assurance systems. In order to do this, a web based survey was 
distributed among officers working at national food authorities. Invitations to 
participate in a survey sent to organizations anonymously are likely to have a high 
non-response. For this reason the invitation to participate was distributed among 
three groups of people that were expected to be potential respondents for this 
survey.  
1. Invitations have been sent to all participants of the meetings of governmental 
food authorities discussing cooperation with private food assurance systems. 
These so-called G2G (government to government) meetings took place alongside 
the annual GFSI Global Food Safety Conferences in Berlin, March 2016 and 
Houston, February 2017.  
2. Invitations have been sent to all members of the Heads of European Food Safety 
Agencies.  
3. In order to get a higher response from non-OECD and non-European countries, 
the invitation was also distributed among the attendants at the Joint FAO/WHO 
Food Standards Programme Codex Alimentarius Commission meeting, 17-22 July 
2017. During this meeting the issue of regulatory approaches to third party 
certification in food safety was discussed. From the 42 attendants who were 
invited as an addition, only four responded to the survey; the high non-response 
is probably because the survey was not tailored to these officials. 
 
All these officials were mailed in person in 2017. Additionally, the addressees were 
invited to forward the invitation to other officials in their own organization or in other 
organizations that have a function in food safety controls in their country. Inviting 
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other officials is expected to contribute to forming as complete a picture as possible 
of existing forms of cooperation with private assurance systems. A reminder was sent 
to all addressees who did not respond. Two more reminders were sent to people 
from countries that were still missing, indicating that a response from their country 
would be very welcome (see appendix 1).  
The survey revealed information from 41 countries (52 respondents). Not 
surprisingly, more than half are European countries. Furthermore, three international 
organizations involved in technical capacity building and assisting governments in 
modernizing food safety regulation responded, two answered the questionnaire and 
one was interviewed via Skype after an e-mail that the questions were not easy to 
answer for someone from an international organization. 
 
Table 1: Countries with response and non-response1 
 Countries response Countries non-response 
Europe (HoA) 25 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, 
Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom 
10 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, 
Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, 
Poland, Scotland, Turkey 
Asia 5 
China, Fiji, Japan, Lebanon, Singapore 
7 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, 
Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, Russian 
federation 
America 5 
Belize, Canada, Chile, Mexico, United 
States 
6 
Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Jamaica 
Africa 4 
Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
2 
Morocco, South Africa 
Australia 2 
Australia, New Zealand 
 
Total 41 25 
 
The survey consists of a combination of questions with pre-fixed answers and open-
ended questions on current and future cooperation with private food safety 
assurance schemes and opinions about private certification (appendix 2). Some 
respondents took great trouble to provide detailed information on open-ended 
                                                     
1  Some respondents did not answer all questions. Respondents that only provided some general 
information about their organization and their position were counted as non-response, 
respondents that did not complete the questionnaire but did provide some information about 
the use of private assurance schemes or their opinions are counted as response. 
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questions, other respondents just answered (some) questions with pre-fixed 
answers. 
The information from the questionnaire is supplemented with information from 
the website of the organizations and other available documents. The respondents 
were asked to provide the url of their organization (and most did) and relevant 
documents (only a few did). This is limited to information that is available in English, 
German, and Dutch. In other languages, only references to specific documents or 
webpages were consulted using Google translate. Representatives from ten countries 
provided additional information by e-mail or in a personal conversation during the 
GFSI Global meeting in March 2018 in Tokyo.  
Countries are taken as units of analysis for issues concerning the use and policy 
towards private assurance schemes. For six countries two or three respondents 
participated in the survey. In case of more than one respondent from the same 
country, they mostly answered these questions similarly or complimentary. For 
qualitative analysis the answers of respondents from the same country are 
integrated. However, for quantitative analysis, when respondents from the same 
country answered the question differently, the answer that implies most cooperation 
with private assurance systems is taken as the answer for the country (even if other 
respondents did answer differently). For matters of opinion and background, 
respondents are taken as units of analysis. 
Background of Respondents 
Most respondents are senior officers working at the national Ministry of Health, the 
national Ministry of Agriculture or the national food safety agency. Most of these 
organizations have a broad range of tasks. Nineteen national organizations are 
responsible for legislation and rulemaking, inspection policy making, legal 
enforcement, inspection of food facilities, auditing food inspections, risk assessment, 
and crisis management. Four organizations have all these tasks except for legislation 
and rulemaking. Others have inspection and enforcement tasks only, or these tasks 
in combination with risk assessment and crisis management. Five organizations have 
multiple tasks without risk assessment. Another five organizations have multiple 
tasks without inspection and enforcement. 
 
Table 2: Educational and professional background of respondents 
Food technology, engineering 19    37%  
Veterinary science, medicine 14  27%  
Chemistry, microbiology 14  27%  
Inspection, auditing services, police, law enforcement 12  24%  
Food industry 9  18%  
Law 4  8%  
Other 8  16%  
Total number of respondents 51  100%  
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The majority of the respondents have a chemical, technical or veterinary background 
and have been working for more than 10 years in the field of food safety (table 2 and 
3). 
 
Table 3: Years professionally working in the field of food safety 
Less than 3 years 3-10 years 10-20 years Over 20 years Total 
3 14 18 20 56 
5% 25% 32% 36% 100% 
 
Six out of ten respondents participated in an international meeting discussing the 
cooperation of public agencies with third party assurance schemes. Only a quarter of 
the respondents indicated that neither they themselves nor one of their colleagues 
ever attended such a meeting (G2G, CCFICS23, HoA working group) (table 4). 
 
Table 4: Respondent attendance of meetings discussing cooperation with private 
assurance schemes 
Attended G2G meeting 2016 and/or 2017 11 
Attended G2G plus CCFICS23 4 
Attended G2G plus HoA PAS working group  2 
Attended HoA PAS working group meeting 7 
Attended CCFICS23 2 
Did not attend such a meeting, but a colleague did attend 7 
Did not attend a meeting 12 
Total N 45 
3. Countries Taking Private Schemes into Account 
A central question of this investigation is to what extent national food authorities 
take participation of a food business operator in a private assurance scheme into 
account in their inspection policy. A private assurance scheme is a scheme developed 
by non-governmental parties for assessing and approving food businesses against a 
defined safety standard. Participation in such a scheme is voluntary (not imposed by 
law or the competent authority). The survey is limited to private assurance of food 
safety and feed safety. Private schemes assuring sustainability, fair trade or animal 
welfare are outside the scope of this survey.  
According to the respondents, organizations in thirteen countries take private 
assurance schemes into account, 27 do not (table 5).2 Organizations in five more 
countries consider to use private assurance schemes in their official controls in the 
future, are in the process of starting to explore the use of private systems, or use 
                                                     
2  Some information is provided for countries. In case of more than one respondent from the same 
country, they mostly answered a question similarly. However, when respondents from the same 
country answered the question differently, the country is counted as taking private assurance 
into account. The same applies to other questions, the answer that implies most cooperation 
with private assurance systems is taken as the answer for the country (even if other respondents 
did answer differently).  
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private schemes in some way. Some respondents that answered that their 
organization is not taking private assurance schemes into account do add that 
another organization in their country is responsible for official controls (and could 
answer the question differently). 
In par. 7 we will look in detail at how these countries take private schemes into 
account. But first we will see what the motives are for taking private assurance 
schemes into account or not.  
 
Table 5: Do countries take private assurance schemes (that cover food and/or feed 
safety) into account in their inspection policy? 
 Yes No3 
OECD 
Countries 
9 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom 
20 
Austria, Chile, Czech Rep., Estonia, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, 
United States 
Non-OECD 
countries 
4 
Egypt, Ivory Coast, Romania, 
Singapore 
7 
Belize, China, Fiji, Ghana, Kenya, Lebanon, 
Serbia 
Total 13 27 
 
The most important reasons to take private assurance schemes into account are that 
it contributes to compliance with regulations, that it implies efficient and effective 
use of public budget, and that unnecessary duplication of controls is avoided. These 
same reasons are mentioned by respondents working in an organization that is 
considering to use private assurance schemes in official controls in the future and 
respondents that expect that this might be considered at some time. Several 
respondents argue that public authorities do not have the capacity to perform 
frequent controls of all businesses that produce and trade food. Additional private 
controls can fill this gap. Public controls will then be able to focus the limited 
resources on areas with higher risk. One respondent mentions pressure from industry 
and politics to incorporate private assurance schemes. 
4. Advantages 
Almost all respondents see advantages of governmental cooperation with private 
assurance systems (table 6). Surprisingly, only two respondents see no advantage at 
all. In their opinion private assurance systems may be useful for food business 
operators but they are irrelevant in official public food control. The main advantages 
are twofold. 
                                                     
3  The respondents of Slovakia do not know whether their organization is taking private schemes 
into account. 
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1. Private audits are a welcome addition to the inspection capacity of public food 
agencies. Cooperation with private certification programs allows public 
authorities to focus their limited resources on the highest risks. Because private 
audits add to the inspection capacity, public inspectors can spend less time on 
inspections of food firms that perform low-risk activities or food business 
operators with a good compliance record. Public inspections can use their limited 
time and resources for what they consider to be the highest risks. The added 
inspection capacity of private systems also contributes to a better coverage 
where authorities are not able to inspect all premises due to shortage of 
resources. 
2. Cooperation with private assurance systems is expected to result in an overall 
improvement of food hygiene and it assists food businesses in complying with 
the law. This contributes to the ultimate goal of public food safety regulation. 
 
Table 6: What are in your opinion the advantages of cooperation with private 
assurance systems?  
Public controls can focus on high risks 26 
Overall improvement of food hygiene 25 
Assisting food business in complying with the law 23 
Added inspection capacity (private audits) 22 
Other 3 
No advantages at all 2 
N (total number of respondents) 42 
5. Disadvantages, Risks and Challenges 
Although almost all respondents see advantages of cooperation with private 
assurance systems, this does not imply that they do not see disadvantages or risks. 
Only one respondent holds the opinion that cooperation with private schemes has 
no disadvantages at all (table 7). Many respondents fear that this type of cooperation 
may put consumer confidence in the governmental safeguarding of food safety at 
risk. There is a potential risk of loss of confidence in food regulation where the 
independence of the auditor and inspection services may be compromised. 
Government is expected to be in full control and will be held accountable. 
Respondents feel that it is often difficult to explain to consumers and even to their 
government, why cooperation with private systems is a beneficial approach. How can 
the government rely on private schemes? It is easily perceived as a loss of public 
power. Government will be held accountable.  
Closely connected to this is the risk of regulatory capture. Public food authorities 
might become dominated by the interests of the food industry. Although safe food 
could be said to be a common interest of both government and food industry, the 
food industry is primarily focused on its own economic interest. Food safety scheme 
owners and private certification and auditing services are primarily interested in 
establishing and maintaining their market, which may not always coincide with public 
interests such as public health. In delegating too much activities to private parties, 
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the government could lose control over the process. This risk is particularly high in 
cases in which industry has more resources and better access to new technology than 
the governmental agencies. For these reasons many respondents stress that the 
government should take care to stay in control by continuous surveillance of the 
performance of private schemes, by only recognizing private schemes temporarily, 
and by taking care that private controls do not replace official controls. This requires 
sufficient public resources (people, expertise, facilities). 
One respondent explains another effect of private schemes being commercial 
entities that are not dedicated to the public interest. Private standards owners are 
hesitant to recognize each other and do not want to recognize government systems 
either as this potentially affects their value proposition and is contrary to their 
economic interest. 
Respondents also point at disadvantages that are related to the performance of 
private systems such as the confidentiality of private audit reports and the 
unreliability of private systems. Private auditors are said to be business-oriented and 
not independent. Moreover, private auditors do not always have a sufficient level of 
experience and knowledge.  
Some respondents point at differences between official controls and private 
assurance schemes in their purpose, focus and approach. Official audits are said to 
be risk-based focusing on risks for public health whereas private audits are said to 
focus on compliance with requirements of the standard. A respondent notes that 
private schemes focus on product safety and tend to neglect hygiene issues. Private 
auditors focus on checking compliance with requirements and often do not validate 
the adequacy of the food safety management plan. 
 
Table 7: What are in your opinion the disadvantages or risks of cooperation with 
private assurance systems?  
Loss consumer confidence in governmental safeguarding of food safety 25 
Regulatory capture (public authorities become dominated by industry) 21 
Confidentiality of private audit reports 18 
Conflicts with legal obligations 18 
Private assurance systems are not reliable 10 
Other disadvantage 11 
No disadvantages at all 1 
N = 41 
 
Private schemes do not necessarily cover all legal requirements with the risk that 
some aspects are not included in the private audits. Governmental authorities should 
be aware of this and also keep an eye on the evolution of the content of the private 
assurance schemes: Are new legal requirements incorporated? Are revised versions 
of a private standard still in line with all applicable food laws?. 
The confidentiality of private audit reports, unreliable private audits and the lack 
of transparency are seen as important risks for cooperation with private assurance 
schemes. These risks make it hard for a public agency who is cooperating with private 
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schemes to provide assurance for compliance with regulations. Particularly in case of 
an incident a public food authority will have a hard time to account for reliance or 
collaboration with private schemes. The authority is an easy prey in such a case. 
 
Table 8: What are in your opinion obstacles to public-private cooperation? 
Multiple different private schemes 30 
No common language between private schemes and public authorities 22 
Public food inspectors need other training and qualifications for new role 22 
We miss knowledge about requirements and operation of private systems 13 
Private scheme owners and auditors are not dedicated to the public interest 13 
The applicable law in my country does not allow cooperation with private assurance 
systems 
9 
Consumers do not trust private assurance systems 8 
Is considered unacceptable (socially or politically) 3 
Other obstacle 4 
No obstacle at all 3 
N = 44 
 
Several respondents regard the added costs for food businesses as a disadvantage of 
private schemes. One respondent points at the concern that increased commercial 
pressure to meet additional requirements of private schemes will cause ‘regulatory 
creep’ and will stifle innovation and flexibility. This argument develops along the 
following lines. Most private schemes are more prescriptive and less flexible in how 
specific outcomes are achieved. Moreover, they require participants to conform to 
many add-ons above and beyond what governmental regulations require. 
Government recognition of these private schemes could put pressure on food 
businesses to meet the additional requirements. Where tight governmental 
regulatory controls are in place, private schemes just add costs and do not provide 
any risk reduction benefits. However, where government regulation or verifications 
are light, the use of private assurance schemes can be valuable and efficient, 
according to this respondent. 
Respondents differ in how they balance the pros and cons of cooperation with 
private assurance systems against each other. For some respondents the advantages 
prevail, as the following quotes show: 
 
 ‘While there are some risks as described above, we feel that if regulators leverage 
private assurances systems in an appropriate measured way these risks will not be 
realized. Thus the need for and benefit of Codex guidance.’ 
 
‘I think that cooperation of competent authorities and private assurance systems is 
desirable. But I think the private assurance systems needs to be superintended by the 
authority.’ 
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Other respondents point at both advantages as well as risks without a balanced 
judgment as the following examples show:  
 
‘The risk would be to lose control over the process: governments should constantly have 
the assurance [that] schemes are working and delivering impartial audits. Therefore, 
surveillance systems should be in place, and recognition should be granted for a set 
period of time, which can be renewed after further assessment. Governments must 
ensure there are sufficient resources to carry out these assessments.’ 
 
‘Possibility for greater assurance and effective use of limited government resources 
through partnership with private assurance systems. Disadvantages are better 
expressed as risks, where the independence of the auditor/inspection services provider 
may be compromised. Community has high expectation that government has full control 
and held accountable, so there are potential risks of loss of confidence in food 
regulation.’ 
 
‘The independence of regulatory authorities is critical in providing consumer assurance 
that the state is protecting their health and interests. The lack of transparency, real or 
otherwise, of industry activities, including audit reports from schemes, makes it very 
challenging as a regulator to provide these assurances. In a small country where 
inspectors are more than likely living in the area where they are inspecting food 
businesses, regulatory capture needs to be managed carefully.’ 
 
For other respondents the disadvantages seem to prevail: 
 
‘Consumers rely on public agencies to provide assurance for compliance with regulations. 
Any hint that that responsibility has been shifted to private sector players engenders 
mistrust. Private sector players are deemed to be protecting their own kind.’ 
 
‘The private certification bodies are business oriented companies. The level, experience 
and knowledge of the auditors in relation to requirements of legislation are not always 
sufficient and uniform.’ 
 
All respondents were also asked an open-ended question: where do you see the 
challenges for the application of private assurance schemes in your official controls? 
Respondents point at conditions that have to be met, such as whether private 
standards align with public standards and whether the private oversight is adequate 
(unannounced audits, safeguards for fraudulent accreditation, effective dealing with 
non-compliances, sufficient food safety knowledge). Related to this, some 
respondents point out that differences between public controls and private 
assurance schemes are a challenge: product safety versus hygiene issues, risk 
paradigm as opposed to just a conformity paradigm, only covering food safety (not 
items such as labelling, misleading, GMO, import and export requirements). Others 
stress the need for governmental agencies to have systems in place to verify the 
claims of private assurance systems (including the exchange of information and 
reliability of audits reports). For others the main challenge is to get public support for 
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such a policy (from consumers, from ministries, from importing countries). Two 
respondents answer that a legal base for such an integration is missing. One 
respondent indicates the risk of cherry picking, the easy bits are being dealt with by 
private assurance systems and the tricky, questionable and often most costly issues 
are left for the public authorities to deal with. 
To illustrate the above, two quotes from countries that do take private assurance 
schemes into account in the official controls and the most ‘negative’ answer. 
 
‘We believe in a partial replacement of the official controls by PAS [Private assurance 
scheme] in the sense that PAS audits can be considered in the risk based official control 
system of establishments. A prerequisite is of course that there is a good collaboration 
between the PAS owners and CA [Competent authority] (e.g. working protocol, 
memorandum of understanding…) and that there are solid mechanisms in place for 
communication and data exchange. However, a complete replacement does not seem 
feasible because as a governmental body the CA still has its role to play in society and 
take its responsibility towards stakeholders and consumers.‘ 
 
‘We consider private assurance schemes may be able to inform the frequency, nature 
and intensity of official controls rather than replacing official controls. Challenges include 
sharing information about individual businesses, determining when the scheme ensures 
non compliances are rectified/ actioned and when this should be passed to the 
competent authority. My view is that private assurance schemes reliably deliver what 
they are set out to deliver; however, this may vary from the official controls undertaken 
by competent authorities. How/ whether the private assurance scheme assesses that 
relevant legislation is being complied with‘ 
 
‘Most [private assurance schemes, th] are multinationals with no respect or con-
sideration for governments, especially those in developing countries. Additionally, there 
are no mechanisms to establish communication.’ 
6. Legal and Political Obstacles to Cooperation with Private Systems 
Almost half of the respondents consider conflicts with legal obligations as a 
disadvantage or risk of cooperation with private assurance systems (table 7). Some 
respondents list several laws that provide a legal obstacle, for example ‘Law on Food 
Safety, Law on Veterinary Matters, Law on State Governmental procedures’, other 
respondents just point out that the agency does not have a legal mandate for such 
cooperation. Two respondents refer to WTO regulations (Article 13 of the WTO/SPS 
Agreement) in their explanation of legal obstacles. 
 
‘Ensuring that the policy approach to private assurance systems does not become a 
technical barrier to trade. This is why [we do] not require certification to a private 
assurance scheme for imports or domestic production.’ 
 
However, other respondents explain that the law allows for this cooperation.  
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‘For EU their actually [are] no legal obstacles. The Official Controls Regulation (EU) 
2017/625, art. 9 says: Competent authorities shall perform official controls on all 
operators regularly on a risk basis and with appropriate frequency taking account of [...] 
the reliability and results of own controls that have been performed by the operators, or 
by a third party at their request, including, where appropriate, private quality assurance 
schemes, [...].’ 
However, even within this general legal frame, there may still be legal obstacles left 
as another respondent points out. 
 
‘At a detailed level there are some considerations around information sharing - 
assessment/ audit reports are owned by individual businesses. Agreement is needed for 
those to be shared, other than as part of an official control where an authorized officer 
(public inspector) may require sight of relevant documentation including assessment 
reports’ 
 
We also asked ‘What are the political obstacles for taking private assurance schemes 
into account (if any)?’. Most respondents did not answer this question. Many 
respondents that did provide an answer responded that they do not see any political 
obstacles. Some even see the opposite, government and politicians want the public 
food inspection to take third party certification into account. Respondents that see 
some obstacles here point at the appearance of lack of government oversight, lack of 
confidence in private assurance schemes, the retention of independence between 
industry and the regulator, the lack of a food safety policy, and care to ensure no 
regulatory creep or imposition of unnecessary cost or restriction on businesses. One 
respondent answers that politicians might be an obstacle or a stimulus: 
 
‘Politicians might be supportive or reluctant, depending the political colour and the 
(economical) timeframe. On the one hand they can be supportive (saving money for the 
government, more responsibility for industry), on the other hand they can be reluctant 
in case of an incident (more responsiblity for the authority, better protection of the 
consumer).’ 
7. Forms of Cooperation 
Respondents from organizations that do take private assurance schemes into account 
or consider to do this, stress that private assurance schemes cannot and should not 
replace official controls. The governmental competent authority has its own 
responsibility and should monitor the performance of the private schemes. This is 
also the position of the Heads of European Food Safety Agencies. 
Countries that cooperate with private control systems differ in the type of 
organization they chose as primary collaboration partners. A (national) food authority 
can collaborate with food safety scheme owners, with certification bodies and 
auditors, and with food businesses: 
1. Official controls take into account accepted private assurance schemes (black 
arrow in figure 1) and the third party certification that is included in the scheme 
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2. Official controls take into account private audits from recognized auditors 
(shaded arrow) 
3. Official controls take into account certificates of the food business operator 
(FBO) (grey arrow) 
 
Figure 1: Schematic overview of forms of taking private controls into account in 
official controls 
 
Although the questions in the survey concerned the collaboration with private 
assurance schemes, some answers revealed information on other forms of co-
operation with private actors as well. Respondents from several countries indicate 
that they do take private assurance schemes into account at the level of food 
business operators. This is the most basic form of taking private assurance schemes 
into account. The competent authority operates as before; participation in a food 
safety scheme and private audit reports are taken into consideration in decisions 
about the frequency or scope of inspections and/or the enforcement measures and 
interventions in case non-compliance is found. This approach does not necessarily 
imply a collaborative relationship between the competent authority and the scheme 
owner or certification body. 
An example is Denmark. Public inspectors use the audit reports by third parties 
during their inspection visit. Inspectors can skip areas that were audited recently by 
a third party and just make spot checks and follow up on deviations found by the third 
party. In this new system the annual inspection frequency is reduced.  
The Finnish approach is rather similar. Food business operators can use any 
scheme they need. The results are taken into account in the inspections by 
municipalities. Inspectors take into account all kind of data including data generated 
by the participation in a private assurance scheme. It is up to the business if private 
audit reports are shared during inspection. The benefit is visible in the scoring in the 
risk classification system and may lead to a reduced inspection frequency. This 
approach is said to be feasible without creating a burden of recognition of schemes 
by the competent authority.  
Food laws
Official controls
Private assurance 
schemes
Third party certification
Food business operators
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Another form of taking private assurance systems into account in official 
controls, is cooperation with certification bodies and auditors. In several countries 
the competent food authority has assessed and recognized certification bodies 
and/or auditors to perform particular audits and inspections. For example, New 
Zealand has a procedure to assess private auditors, whereas Belgium assesses 
certification bodies. After recognition the auditors and certification bodies 
respectively, are qualified to perform audits to validate that food businesses work 
conform the rules. In both Belgium and New Zealand, food businesses in several 
situations have the choice to have a public inspector or a recognized private auditor 
check their compliance with governmental rules. The advantage for the public agency 
is that the government needs less inspection capacity because private auditors do 
(part of) the job. Another advantage of this form of cooperation is that the competent 
authority keeps control over the scheme, this applies to both the substantive norms 
and the inspection protocol. Private auditors check compliance with governmental 
rules. In Belgium, the recognized certification bodies are only allowed to check 
whether food business operators work in compliance with an approved national 
sector guide for good hygienic practice or a standard that has been accepted as 
equivalent to an approved sector guide.4 In New Zealand, recognized private auditors 
may perform audits to evaluate the validity of a custom food control plan, and 
verification audits to check whether the food business is following the rules and 
keeping records.5 
The third form of cooperation of public authorities with private assurance 
schemes is the assessment and recognition of certification programs. Food 
authorities in countries such as Canada, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
France, focus on food safety scheme owners. They do this because they consider the 
scheme owner responsible for the performance of the whole system, including the 
performance of certification bodies and auditors. In these countries, participation in 
a recognized private assurance scheme is taken into account in official controls. In 
the next section we will provide more detail on how the private schemes are 
assessed. 
8. Assessment of Private Assurance Schemes 
Six countries (that is half of the countries that take private assurance schemes into 
account in their inspection policy) are involved in assessing the scope and reliability 
of these private schemes (table 9). Most of these countries do have a program or 
process for assessing private assurance schemes. Private systems can ask for 
assessment under this program. In five other countries the assessment of private 
assurance schemes is still in development. 
The assessment of an assurance system is generally organized in the following 
successive steps or phases: 
1. Comparison of scope and substantial norms of the scheme with the public 
standards; 
                                                     
4  See country report Belgium for more details (appendix 3). 
5  See country report New Zealand for more details (appendix 3). 
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2. Testing the performance of the private system; 
3. Negotiating the terms of cooperation. 
 
The first phase contains checks on formal requirements and a comparison of the 
scope and substantive norms of the scheme with the regulatory standards. 
Acceptance of the scheme by the national accreditation body or an accreditation 
body working under the international accreditation framework is required in most 
countries. Another important element is the establishment of equivalence: do the 
norms of the private standard cover all relevant governmental standards? Several 
food agencies investigated this in the past decade.6 A private scheme applying for 
recognition often has to draw up an equivalence table showing the similarities and 
differences between the scheme and the governmental rules. Usually, the adequacy 
of the system of oversight of the private scheme is also included in the assessment: 
requirements for certification bodies, scheduling of control visits, unannounced 
audits, dealing with non-conformances, training and expertise of auditors.  
 
Table 9: In what context do you (plan to) assess private schemes? (Number of 
countries)  
                                  Taking private assurance systems into account? Yes No 
We have a program or process for assessing private assurance schemes; 
private systems can ask for assessment 
5 1 
We have research projects that assess private assurance schemes (for 
example to investigate possibilities for cooperation or just to know what is 
going on) 
2 0 
we only assess private assurance schemes in the daily inspection routine 1 1 
Other 1 3 
N-countries 6 5 
 
The second phase consists of the competent authority testing the performance of the 
private scheme. This may contain some of the following elements: analysing 
inspection records of certified firms, witness audits, audits of certified firms, 
comparing audit reports by the competent authority with audit reports by third party 
certification bodies. A third phase is negotiating and agreeing on the modalities of 
the recognition. This includes the conditions of the recognition, e.g. related to the 
                                                     
6  The UK Food Standards Agency has published several studies comparing private standards with 
government standards, e.g. Robinson 2017 and Wright et al. 2013. The New Zealand Ministry of 
Primary Industry published its conclusion from the evaluation of three food safety schemes to 
ensure they meet the requirements of the Food Act 2014: GLOBALGAP, New Zealand Good 
Agricultural Practice (NZGAP), and the British Retail Consortium (BRC) for horticultural operators. 
https://www.mpi.govt.nz/news-and-resources/consultations/horticulture-sector-section-40-
applications/. Assurance schemes and certification bodies also published equivalence tables, for 
example SQF Level 2– Final Preventive Controls for Human Food Rule Comparison Modules 2 & 
11(https://www.sqfi.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/SQF-Final-Preventive-Controls-for-
Humans-comparison-mod-2-11-FINAL-2015.pdf). 
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exchange of information, to training and qualifications of the auditors, the terms for 
ending the cooperation, monitoring the private scheme by the competent authority, 
the task and duties of the parties. This phase ends with the signing of a memorandum 
of understanding or contract.7 
 
Table 10: What requirements do you or your organization (plan to) apply in  
assessing private assurance schemes? 
                   Taking private assurance systems into account? Yes No, but 
future 
plans 
Total 
Independency of certification and auditing 6 3 9 
Accreditation 6 3 9 
Scope 6 2 8 
Frequency and duration of audits 6 1 7 
Training, experience, education of auditors 6 1 7 
Sharing of information 6 1 7 
Compliance with ISO standards 5 2 7 
Adequate dealing with non-compliance 5 2 7 
Compliance with Codex standards 3 3 6 
Free public availability of scheme requirements 4 1 5 
Public available list of certificated sites/firms 4 1 5 
Recognition by GFSI 2 3 5 
Access of my organization to audit reports 3 2 5 
Participation of stakeholders in developing standard 4 1 5 
Good performance private scheme 4 1 5 
Motivation private scheme on food safety 3 2 5 
Legal protection and complaints procedure 3 1 4 
I don’t know 0 1 1 
Total n 6 5 11 
  
9. Private Assurance Schemes Taken into Account 
In what way do the organizations in their inspections consider the participation of a 
food operator in a (recognised) private assurance scheme? Often it will result in a 
reduced inspection frequency (table 11). Also the use of private audit data for public 
inspection and an adapted scope of inspection are ways to take a private assurance 
                                                     
7  See for more detailed information on the procedure for the assessment of private assurance 
schemes in Belgium: http://www.favv-afsca.fgov.be/autocontrole-fr/equivalence/, Canada 
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/about-the-cfia/accountability/consultations-and-engagement/ 
regulatory-risk-based-oversight/private-certification-policy/eng/1452808755126/14528088217 
99?chap=8; the Netherlands: http://ketenborging.nl/, Scotland: http://www.foodstandards. 
gov.scot/downloads/Earned_Recognition_Practice_Guidance_Scotland_-_2016.pdf, UK: 
https://signin.riams.org/files/display_inline/48670/FINAL-FSA-Guidance-on-Approved-Assur-
ance-Schemes-July-2018-06082018.pdf. See country reports in appendix 3. 
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scheme into account in inspection policy. Respondents from three countries mention 
an adapted intervention or sanction policy. In two countries participation in a private 
scheme can come down to the absence of public inspections of premises. However, 
several respondents stress that the key issue is whether the company can objectively 
show it is delivering on its responsibilities. Third party audits are just one way the 
companies can demonstrate performance. 
 
 ‘Together with other risk factors we may adjust the frequency, duration and scope of 
the inspection. This approach does not require businesses to become certified, but if they 
do it will factor in to their risk characterization.‘  
 
Another respondent comments that food/feed businesses affiliated with an accepted 
private assurance scheme  
 
‘can earn “adapted supervision”, like lower inspection frequency, less time spend in the 
establishment, adapted focus during the inspection/audit. Not all companies get the 
same adapted supervision, because one of the criteria is the “track record” of the 
company.’ 
 
Table 11: In what way do you take the participation in a private assurance system 
into account?  Countries 
Adapted frequency of inspection visits 9 
Use of private audit data for public inspection 9 
Adapted scope of inspection 6 
Adapted intervention or sanction policy 4 
No site inspections, only system audits 2 
Other 2 
Total 13 
 
Respondents were asked what types of private assurance system they take into 
account. Food safety schemes recognised by GFSI and assurance schemes from 
industry associations and for good agricultural practice were most mentioned (table 
12). 
Respondents were asked to provide names of the schemes that are taken into 
account in the undertaking of official controls. Not surprisingly, the internationally 
operating GFSI recognized food safety schemes were mentioned more than once. 
This applies to BRC, FSSC22000, GlobalGAP, IFS and SQF. These are worldwide the 
most used certification systems initiated by retailers and corporate food 
manufacturers to assure that their supply meets high standards of food safety (and 
quality). Respondents from several countries refer to (national) operating schemes 
for farming (British Egg Industry council, CanadaGAP, Global red meat standard, 
North Ireland Beef & Lamb Farm Quality Assurance Scheme, Red Tractor, Vegaplan, 
Welsh Lamb and beef producers). The Netherlands has accepted several national 
schemes and programs, many working particularly in the hotel and catering industry 
(Bureau de Wit, Diversey, Eurofins, GGD Amsterdam, Houwers group, Kroonenburg, 
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Sensz, SVVW). Three countries also mention schemes in the feed sector (AIC, FamiQS, 
Feed chain alliance, FEMAS, TASCC, UFAS).8 Halal certification for meat, organic 
certifiers and RENAR, the Romanian Accreditation Association were also mentioned. 
The private schemes that are taken into account cover a wide variety of industries 
including dairy, fresh red meat, poultry, fish, eggs, fresh vegetables and fruits, dry 
groceries, cereals, ready to eat food, and feed.  
 
Table 12: What types of private assurance system do you take into account? 
 Country Respondent 
Internal company assurance systems 5 5 
Company supply chain quality assurance systems (food firm standard) 5 5 
GFSI-recognized food safety schemes (such as GlobalGAP, BRC, SQF) 8 9 
Assurance systems from industry associations (eg butchers, fruit juice 
producers, catering) 
7 7 
Private export certification schemes 4 4 
Private assurance schemes for good agricultural practices (GAP) 6 6 
Other third party assurance schemes 9 12 
Other 1 2 
Total 13 16 
 
We also asked if dealing with private assurance schemes based in a foreign country 
posed specific difficulties. Five respondents replied to this question substantively. 
Two of them did not identify specific difficulties in dealing with schemes based 
outside their country. One respondent points at practical difficulties:  
 
- the assessment procedure (documents) has to be translated in English  
- for the desk study it might be necessary to travel abroad (to the office of the scheme 
owner)  
- different legal approaches, but also cultural differences (e.g. in case of exchanging 
information) 
 
Two respondents find foreign based schemes less responsive to the needs of their 
country: 
 
‘The unnecessary duplication of their activities with our own and their inability / 
unwillingness to consider alternatives. Also the lack of relevance of many of the criteria 
to the context that exists in our country. The one size fits all and conformity as opposed 
                                                     
8  Food authorities of several countries provide information on their website about recognised 
assurance schemes: Belgium http://www.favv-afsca.fgov.be/autocontrole-fr/equivalence/, 
Netherlands: http://ketenborging.nl/kwaliteitsschemas-en-status/, https://www.nvwa.nl/on-
derwerpen/kwaliteitssystemen-zelfcontrolesystemen-en-toezicht-nvwa/horeca-ambacht-
zorginstellingen-retail-voedselveiligheid-haccp/geaccepteerde-kwaliteitssystemen-horeca-
ambacht-zorginstellingen-retail, UK: https://www.food.gov.uk/business-guidance/earned-rec-
ognition-approved-assurance-schemes. See also country reports in appendix 3. 
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risk-based mentality adds unnecessary costs and restrictions and can even impede 
effectiveness.’ 
 
‘We would like the schemes to include other regulations than food safety e.g. labelling, 
misleading, food fraud, import and export requirements.’ 
10. Assessment and Monitoring of Certification Bodies 
Authorities in ten countries are involved in assessing or controlling certification 
bodies (table 13). In four countries this is in development. In most countries this 
assessment is limited to the certification of organic farming. Private certification 
bodies operating in the area of organic certification are accredited by the national 
accreditation body and approved or accredited by the food authority. 
In both Belgium and New Zealand certification bodies/auditors are assessed and 
recognized to perform specific functions. The collaboration of the Belgian food 
authority with private actors in the assurance of food safety is mainly found in the 
delegation to private certification bodies of audits to validate compliance of food 
operators with an approved national sector guide for good hygiene practice. This 
delegation is based on a national legal provision.9 Organizations can apply for 
recognition. Requirements for recognition include the qualifications of the auditors, 
accreditation, independence, reporting of audit results and major non-conformities 
to the Belgian authority. The Belgian authority has approved 14 certification bodies 
to perform validation audits under particular conditions. The recognition is valid for 
three years during which the Certification Body participates in a monitoring program 
consisting of witness audits and headquarter audits. The delegated audits are 
voluntary, it is recommended that food business operators let their food safety 
management system be validated. About half of the primary producers have done so, 
one out of five food processing businesses and only very few food retail businesses 
and restaurants have a validated self-checking system. Establishments can choose a 
recognized private certification body or the Belgian food authority to perform this 
audit. Almost all validation audits are performed by a private Certification Body. Less 
than 0,5% of the validations are due to an audit by the competent authority. A 
validated food safety system results in a reduced frequency of routine inspections 
and a reduced financial contribution. 
Also in New Zealand operators can choose between a private and public auditor. 
Most businesses are required to operate under a food control plan or a national 
programme. Custom Food Control Plans (FCP) need to be independently evaluated 
before registration. The food business has to contract a recognised evaluator to 
perform this task. To be recognised as an FCP evaluator a person needs to be 
appropriately skilled, reputable and of good character, able to maintain an 
appropriate degree of impartiality and independence, and able to meet the 
requirements of any regulation. Some persons recognized as an evaluator are 
                                                     
9  Art. 10, Koninklijk besluit betreffende autocontrole, meldingsplicht en traceerbaarheid in de 
voedselketen, 14 november 2003. 
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employed with private organizations, others are self-employed or employed with the 
Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI). All food businesses need to contract a verifier 
recognized by the MPI. The verifier will check that the business is following the rules 
and keeping records, and provides feedback on areas that need improvement. 
Agencies recognized for verification are private people or organizations, and local 
councils. These verifiers report to MPI. 
Within the new legal framework the US FDA has established a voluntary program 
for the accreditation of third party certification bodies to conduct food safety audits 
against the US food safety regulations and issue certifications for foreign facilities and 
the foods they produce. Third party audits can be conducted by a foreign government 
agency or a private concern. Third party certifications have two purposes, it assists 
importers to establish their eligibility to participate in the Voluntary Qualified 
Importer Program and FDA may require certification as a condition of entry, for 
example in situations of food safety risks.10 
Other countries explicitly do not access certification bodies, either because this 
is regarded the responsibility of accreditation bodies and the scheme owner or 
because assessing all certification bodies would be too burdensome. 
 
Table 13: Are you or your organization involved in assessing or controlling 
certification bodies?  Number of countries 
Yes 10 
No 25 
Still in development 4 
N 39 
11. Exchange of Information with Private Assurance Schemes 
The confidentiality of audit reports and of the relation between private certification 
bodies and their clients are often mentioned as an obstacle for the collaboration of 
public food authorities with private assurance schemes. For that reason we asked 
whether private assurance schemes and public food authorities share information 
with each other. Respondents from six countries indicated that private assurance 
schemes shared information with their organization, in seven countries this is in 
development. Organizations in five countries share some information with private 
assurance schemes, in five other countries this is still in development. 
 
Table 14: Is sharing information part of some formal arrangement?   
 Number of countries 
Memorandum of understanding 3 
Contract 1 
Program 1 
Legal obligation 3 
Other formal arrangement 1 
N resp 6 
 
                                                     
10  See country report in appendix 3 for more detailed information. 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2018/01 
 
 
27 
In all cases, the sharing of information by private assurance schemes is part of a 
formal arrangement, mostly a Memorandum of understanding or a legal obligation 
(table 14). What kind of information do private assurance schemes share with public 
food authorities? In all six countries, the names of food businesses that participate in 
the scheme is shared with public authorities. That is information about the issuing of 
certificates and withdrawal of certificates. Several other respondents point out that 
this kind of information is publicly available on the website of certification bodies, 
accreditation bodies or scheme owners. Where this information is already accessible, 
private assurance schemes do not need to share this information with public 
authorities. Audit results are mostly not publicly available. Respondents from two 
countries indicate that private assurance schemes share all audit reports with their 
organization. In the other countries the private schemes only share specific audit 
reports on request of the authority. Information on major non-conformities is also 
often shared, none of the respondents said that information on all non-conformities 
was shared. Information indicating possible serious threats to public health and the 
safety of food, and audit results on aggregate level are also shared in several 
countries.  
The issue of information sharing is under discussion in several agencies. One of 
the obstacles for the sharing of information is that information about audits and 
inspections is confidential. One respondent pointed out that audit reports should not 
be sent to the authorities as the principle of open government could allow for public 
access to these reports. By taking note of the reports during inspection visits this risk 
is excluded. Another respondent notes that based on discussions to date, many 
scheme owners are very willing to co-operate in the sharing of information.  
 
Table 15: What kind of information do you share?  Number of Countries 
names of certified food businesses found non-compliant 2 
all inspection results 0 
aggregated inspection results 3 
information indicating possible serious threats to public health/safety 
of food 
2 
public information on food safety incidents 3 
confidential information on food safety incidents 1 
complaints about firms, auditors, certification bodies or schemes 1 
other 0 
N 5 
 
Governmental organizations sharing information with private assurance schemes are 
even less common. Only five countries share information, only the Netherlands and 
the UK share several kinds of information, including aggregated inspection results 
and information indicating serious threats to public health (table 15). The US Food 
and Drug Administration does not share information directly to a private assurance 
scheme; information on food safety incidents is shared in the public domain and 
accessible by anyone. Several respondents remark that their organization is 
considering what information is needed by private assurance schemes to improve 
their system. Some organizations that do not exchange information and audit data 
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with private assurance schemes are engaging in discussions exchanging opinions on 
issues such as certification systems and food safety management. 
12. Opinions about Private Assurance Schemes  
In the questionnaire respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with 13 
items intended to measure the opinion of the respondent on private assurance 
schemes.11 Most respondents showed a neutral or positive attitude towards private 
assurance schemes (table 16).12 One third of the respondents had a positive 
opinion.13 Surprisingly, none of the respondents showed a negative attitude.14 All 
respondents agreed that it is of vital importance for food businesses to assure the 
safety of their products. Most respondents agreed that accredited third part 
certification against a food safety standard contributes to an improved level of food 
safety.  
There might be an acquiescence bias, that is the tendency to agree with a 
statement. Positive formulated items had a slightly lower average score than 
negative formulated items. The idea is that this is outweighed in the overall scale 
average by the use of both positive and negative worded items. 
Opinions were most divided on the question whether food businesses will 
comply with food safety regulations when they expect to do so unnoticed. Thirteen 
respondents agree that food businesses will not comply when they expect to do so 
unnoticed, just as much disagree. Respondents from countries that do take private 
assurance schemes into account have a more positive opinion on the compliance-
mindedness of food businesses.15 
Respondents from organizations that do take private assurance schemes into account 
have a slightly more positive attitude towards private assurance schemes. However, 
the difference is only small.16  
 
 
  
                                                     
11  All items had five scale points, ‘don’t know’ was included as additional answering option. Six 
items were positively worded, 7 negatively. A simple 13-item Likert-type scale was constructed 
by summarizing the scores on the items and calculate the mean score for each respondent. For 
the scale, the scores on negatively worded items were reversed. A score of 1 is strongly positive 
towards private assurance schemes, 2 is positive, 3 is neutral, 4 is negative and a score of 5 is 
strongly negative. 
12  The average score is 2.5. 
13  Average score 2 or less. 
14  Average score 4 or higher. Only 4 respondents have a score higher than 3. The highest average 
score is 3.77. 
15  Average score for respondents from countries that do take private assurance schemes into 
account on this item is 2.6, the average score of respondents from countries that do not take PAS 
into account is 3.7. 
16  Average score for respondents from countries that do take private assurance schemes into 
account is 2.3, the average score of the other respondents is 2.5. 
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Table 16: Opinions. Average score and number of respondents per item17 
Item Average 
score18 
(Strongly) 
agree with 
item 
(Strongly) 
disagree 
with item 
N =19 
For food businesses it is of vital import-
ance to assure the safety of their products  
 
1.1 
 
45 
 
0 
 
46 
Accredited third party certification against 
a food safety standard contributes to an 
improved level of food safety 
 
2.1 
 
33 
 
1 
 
45 
I have fundamental objections against 
public food authorities collaboration with 
private food safety assurance schemes  
 
2.1 
 
3 
 
26 
 
45 
GFSI recognized food safety schemes are 
reliable 
2.4 20 1 44 
Third party certification is unreliable 2.5 5 26 46 
I support increased adoption of private 
food safety assurance schemes in my 
country 
 
2.6 
 
21 
 
6 
 
45 
In my country, reports by certification 
bodies are credible and sound 
 
2.6 
 
16 
 
4 
 
45 
In my country, consumers do not trust 
private assurance schemes 
 
2.7 
 
5 
 
12 
 
46 
Certification bodies are only interested in 
making money 
 
2.9 
 
6 
 
15 
 
45 
Food businesses will not comply with food 
safety regulations when they expect to do 
this unnoticed 
 
3 
 
13 
 
14 
 
45 
In my country, consumer organizations 
support the integration of private 
assurance schemes in governmental 
inspection policy  
 
3.2 
 
5 
 
8 
 
45 
Transnational private assurance schemes 
are a barrier for farmers and food 
producers in developing countries 
 
3.3 
 
15 
 
8 
 
46 
Private assurance schemes tend to 
overestimate recordkeeping and 
administrative requirements above 
providing for good hygiene  
 
3.3 
 
13 
 
6 
 
45 
Average score 13 items 2.5    
13. Acquaintance with GFSI and GFSI Recognized Schemes 
Almost all respondents have heard of the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). This is 
of course not surprising, as many respondents were invited to participate in the 
survey because they have attended a G2G meeting connected to a global conference 
of GFSI. The awareness of GFSI recognized food safety certification programs varies 
                                                     
17  See note 7. 
18  An average score of 1 is strongly positive towards private assurance schemes, 2 is positive, 3 is 
neutral, 4 is negative and a score of 5 is strongly negative. For the scale, the scores on negative 
worded items (printed in italics) were reversed. Respondents who answered ‘don’t know’ are not 
included in the calculation of the average. 
19  N includes respondents who responded ‘Neutral’ and ‘Don’t know’. 
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from fairly familiar to virtually unknown (table 17). Three-quarters of the 
respondents say they know what the BRC standards program is doing, BRC being the 
most well-known. Most respondents are not familiar with RiskPlaza, Primus GFS and 
GRMS. Particularly, the schemes that have a low number of participants and that 
operate only in a few countries are less well-known. 
 
Table 17: Familiarity with GFSI and GFSI benchmarked private assurance schemes 
(number of respondents) 
 Unknown Just heard 
of 
Know 
what they 
do 
Have  
attended 
meetings 
Some 
collaboration 
N 
GFSI 2 10 13 11 8 44 
BRC 3 8 27 2 4 44 
GlobalGap 6 6 24 5 1 42 
FSSC22000 8 8 20 2 2 40 
IFS 11 8 17 3 3 42 
SQF 20 6 12 1 2 41 
Global Aqua-
culture 
Alliance 
22 2 3 4 5 40 
ChinaHACCP 23 6 9 3 0 41 
CanadaGAP 16 16 7 1 1 41 
Red tractor 24 8 5 1 2 40 
Primus GFS 29 5 5 1 0 40 
GRMS 27 8 4 1 0 40 
RiskPlaza 32 4 2 1 1 40 
13. Miscellaneous Issues 
Do the private assurance schemes contribute to compliance with legal regulations or 
improved food safety? Do the private systems actually do what they promise to do? 
We were curious to know whether agencies had information about the effectiveness 
of private assurance schemes. Most respondents do not have any evidence on the 
effectiveness of private assurance schemes (so far). Only five respondents, all from 
countries that do take private assurance schemes into account in their inspections, 
answer this question in the affirmative (see table 18). 
 
Table 18: Evidence on effectiveness of private assurance schemes  
Australia Through verification audits 
New Zealand Parallel monitoring data, duplicate audit data and system audit 
assessments 
Netherlands We have experiences with private schemes which operate B2C (service 
sector, catering industry, retail). The performance (incl. self-corrective 
actions) of these schemes is monitored by NVWA for many years now. It 
shows these systems are effective. For the B2B systems (like BRC, IFS, 
FSSC22000) we have just started to analyse the performances. We have 
some indications these systems are effective (mainly for the pre-
requisites). We recently started to develop a method for measuring the 
effectiveness. 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2018/01 
 
 
31 
France Staff performing official controls have reported accordance between the 
outcome of official controls and private schemes’ audit conclusions. 
United Kingdom We have recently completed a pilot study working with the British Retail 
Consortium (BRC) Global Standards to determine the potential for an 
earned recognition scheme for food hygiene and food standards official 
controls for those establishments certified under the BRC Global Standard 
for Food Safety. https://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/fsa-brc-
report-oct17.pdf. In summary, the study showed that there is sufficient 
commonality between the BRC Global Standards audit processes and 
food hygiene interventions carried out by Competent Authorities to merit 
scoping options for recognising the assurance provided by BRC Global 
Standards audits to inform the nature, frequency and intensity of official 
controls. However, there are a number of issues to be addressed and the 
extent and intensity of that recognition requires further consideration to 
determine the best option taking into account the findings of this pilot 
and wider work. 
 
Do organizations have any other methods of gathering information on a business 
operator’s compliance, other than the agencies’ own checks? Most of the 
respondents that answered this open question said they have no other methods than 
those of official controls by the competent authorities. The remaining respondents 
mention a wide variety of other methods, including audit reports from certification 
bodies, information from the EU Rapid Alert system, reports from other official 
control bodies (e.g. customs, local authorities, tax authorities, police, foreign 
competent authorities), test results or reports from the food business, consumer 
complaints, and market rejections. One respondent explains that a system based on 
several sources is being developed to monitor the performance of private systems. 
 
‘We are still developing the method for monitoring the private system. We intend to use:  
- our own random spot checks (specific monitoring checks)  
- our own information of other inspections/audits  
- complaints and incidents (both on company level and sector level)  
- meta data from private assurance schemes (still under construction)  
- risk analyses of the supply chain (carried out by our Scientific Department)  
- specific sector or target group analyses.’ 
 
Asked about the ideal situation regarding the involvement of private assurance 
schemes in public food safety control, many respondents stress that private 
assurance should be complimentary to official controls, that responsibilities of the 
parties should be clear, that a legal base is needed, that private schemes should align 
with legislation and a certificate should include conformity to food safety legislation 
(or all food legislation). It is also mentioned that participation in a private assurance 
scheme should not be mandatory, and that sharing of information is important. 
 
‘Private assurance schemes should remain as a business to business decision. They 
should complement but not replace official controls. By taking them into account, 
regulators can better target their limited resources to areas of highest risk.’ 
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‘We have experience with private third parties certifying as collaborators from the 
government. They are very useful once we do not have enough financial resources to 
have quantity of people doing visits and surveillance of all the regulated companies.’ 
 
Some respondents articulate specific ideas. One respondent is of the opinion that 
there should be only one certification scheme to comply with most customers’ 
requirements. Another respondent argues in favour of a worldwide agreed approach 
to the assessment and recognition of assurance schemes. For one respondent the 
involvement of private assurance should be limited to areas where regulatory 
oversight is light and added assurances are required. Yet another respondent 
advocates a strong partnership between private assurance schemes and government 
to share information particularly in the area of emerging issues related to new 
technologies in the development and processing of food. One respondent regards 
the assessment or approval of certification schemes as an extra burden and proposes 
to take the certification results into account during inspection of a food business 
without assessment of the scheme. 
Some respondents refer to global discussions about the risk that recognition of 
certification schemes might impose directly or indirectly an obligation or restriction 
on international trade by increased requirements above and beyond the legal 
requirements. Besides, collaboration with particular private schemes might give 
those schemes a commercial advantage compared to other schemes.  
 
‘At CCFICS23 we extended the scope of the work to include the full mandate of Codex 
e.g. also to include fair practices in the food trade. Essentially private assurance schemes 
can be used as a partial substitute in any area the government requires some level of 
assurance. We should not restrict ourselves to what feels like a replication of the 
obligations espoused in the EU’s Official Controls Directive. Lastly we have to ensure we 
place even greater care that any recognition does not impose directly or indirectly an 
obligation or restriction on international trade. The WTO/SPS Article 13 debates have 
been quite heated here as has been the reaction from developing economies who already 
see compliance with private standards as a barrier to their trade.’ 
‘Most of the countries of OIRSA [International Regional Organization for Plant and 
Animal Health in Central America] we deal with, see private schemes as money making 
companies and replacing their role. They do not understand the positive role that private 
certifications do by filling the gap not covered by them.’ 
14. Reflection on the Results 
This final paragraph is not a summary of the findings, that would only lead to 
repetition. Instead, I will reflect on the observed developments. Starting from the 
idea of polycentric regulation and a regulatory space occupied by many different 
actors, the idea of regulatory enrolment (Black 2003) seems to be particularly helpful 
in analyzing the relations between public and private actors. Enrolment is the process 
by which an actor tries to link with another actor in order to enhance its own 
regulatory capacity in order to perform his own tasks better. Regulatory capacity is  
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‘the actual or potential possession of resources plus the existence of actual and potential 
conditions that make it likely that those resources will be deployed both now and in the 
future in such a way as to further the identified goals of those seeking to regulate (…)’ 
(Black 2003, 72).  
 
Six key regulatory resources are found to be crucial to perform regulatory functions: 
information, expertise, wealth, authority and legitimacy, strategic position, and 
organizational capacity (Black 2003, 73-79). Every actor has its own regulatory 
capacities and will be strong in particular resources and weak in others. By joining, 
borrowing or alternating resources from another actor in the field, actors may 
strengthen their capacity in achieving their regulatory goals. Accordingly, also the 
effectiveness of the regime as a whole can be increased. Successful enrolling will 
include a mutual process that benefits both actors in some way. 
The integration of private systems in official controls could be a win-win situation 
for both parties as it adds up the capacities of both systems. Both public food 
agencies and private food programs could very well use the resources available to 
the other party. That can explain why we see both trying to enroll the other. However, 
we must not exaggerate the extent of this development. The survey showed that only 
about one third of the governments is engaged in this process. 
Public food agencies can tap into the private inspection capacity. That is 
important because public funding falls short. Most agencies do not have sufficient 
capacity to perform frequent inspections at all sites of food business operators (as 
there are many of these). Budget cuts and a policy of a lean state and minimal 
regulatory burden make this even more important. In countries without a well-
established governmental food safety legislation and control system (e.g. non-OECD 
countries in Africa and beyond) not only the private inspection capacity is very much 
needed, but also the expertise, the organizational capacity and strategic position of 
private parties can be welcome. However, it is especially in these non-OECD countries 
that governments and other actors often perceive private assurance schemes as a 
threat, imposing additional requirements and trade barriers, not suited to the 
situation in their country, and to the advancement of Western food industry and 
consumers only. This resistance is understandable, the transnational private schemes 
have been established with a view to the interests of Western companies and 
consumers and are imposed on producers all over the world. The introduction of 
private food standards could exclude small farmers in developing countries from 
important (export) markets. On the other hand, standards can also generate benefits 
for poor farmers in developing countries (Swinnen et al. 2015). 
Private controls are not restricted within the boundaries of the national 
jurisdiction. Global food supply chains are hard to control for national public 
agencies. Here private controls are a valuable addition. Moreover, it might enhance 
the public task, because private control systems promise to improve the general level 
of food safety. It also fits into the new legislation in the EU, US and Canada that 
attributes the primary responsibility for food safety to the food industry. 
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For private assurance programs and third party certification agencies, the main 
resource they get from cooperation with public actors is increased legitimacy and 
authority. Private assurance schemes and third party certification agencies are not 
considered legitimate and authoritative automatically. They are often mistrusted by 
consumers, media, politicians and governments (how can industry be trusted to 
control industry?). Recognition by a government may add to their legitimacy and 
authority. Certification programs and auditors that are recognized by a public 
authority strengthen their market position in two ways. Industry might be more 
inclined to get private certification because certification contributes to compliance 
with public regulations or even results in reduced official controls. Second, accepted 
private schemes and auditors become more attractive compared to schemes and 
auditors that have no public recognition, so their market share will increase. 
Public private cooperation could be a win-win-win situation: 
• Public agencies can focus on bad apples and big risks. 
• Private actors get legitimacy and a stronger market position. 
• Food business operators get choices (participate in private assurance program or 
not? Which program? Which certifier?). 
 
However, there are some potential risks. From a public interest perspective, the risks 
can be roughly divided into four categories: conflicts of interest, the capacity of 
private actors to perform adequate controls, the willingness of private actors to 
adequate control, and regulatory capture.  
Public authorities can only rely on private food safety controls when public 
interests are shared by the private actors. In case the interests of private parties 
deviate from public interests one has to be careful with reliance on private controls. 
Within the private control system conflicts of interest also exist. For example the 
relation of auditors and certification bodies with the food businesses they control is 
a commercial relationship. Food businesses pay for the auditing and certification 
services and these services depend on continued service contracts with their clients. 
This puts the independence of controls in danger (Lytton and McAllister 2014). The 
relationship between certification and auditing services and the food businesses they 
control is based on confidentiality. Typically, audit results are not publicly available 
and cannot be shared. This accounts for a lack of transparency and accountability of 
the private systems. This makes the issue of sharing information challenging. It can 
be argued that the commercial interests that dominate the private system will result 
in a race to the bottom, assurance schemes and certification services competing for 
a large share of the market could be inclined to be more lenient than their 
competitors. However, as far as the transnational GFSI benchmarked food safety 
certification programs are concerned, the opposite seems to be happening. Over the 
years, the programs have become more elaborated including new issues (such as 
fraud and auditor competences) and tightening up requirements. 
A second cluster of risks is connected to the capacity of the private actors to 
perform adequate controls. Issues that are at stake here are the custom to announce 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2018/01 
 
 
35 
audit visits, the lack of sufficiently qualified auditors and the focus of private auditors 
on administrative controls (above actual controls of sites and products). 
Another important condition is the willingness of private actors to adequately 
control. When auditors and certification services are primarily focused on satisfying 
their customers, public interests may play the second fiddle. Although food safety is 
in the general interest of food businesses and actors within the private certification 
system, short term commercial interests may get the upper hand. Recently it has 
been stressed that not all food business operators are motivated to prioritize food 
safety and to work on improving food safety. For this reason the GFSI and private 
scheme owners are engaged in discussing the possibilities to improve food safety 
culture in the food industry (GFSI 2018). 
Last but not least, governmental agencies can lose track of what happens in 
practice within the food industry. It is important that public food authorities are not 
put out of action. They need to develop a system of continuous monitoring of the 
performance of private systems (including system audits and random reality checks) 
and keep their knowledge up to date in order to prevent regulatory capture. Even in 
case the public agency keeps control and overview, the perception in society may be 
different. It is in particular this risk that respondents fear most. Reliance on private 
control systems can lead to consumers no longer having confidence in the 
governmental safeguarding of food. As private parties increase their legitimacy 
through government approval, the government risks reducing its own legitimacy and 
authority by relying on private controls. The enrolment of regulatory capacities of 
other parties is not always a simple win-win game. Although not quite a zero-sum 
game, the advantage for one party can be at the disadvantage for the other. 
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Appendix 1 
Text of invitation to participate in survey and reminder mails 
Invitation  
People were invited to participate in the survey with the following email. Later a similar 
invitation was sent to the attendants at the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme 
Codex Alimentarius Commission meeting, 17-22 July 2017 
 
Subject: Invitation survey G2G public private cooperation in food governance 
 
Dear [name], 
 
You are invited to participate in a survey on Public-private collaboration in food safety 
governance. We would highly appreciate your cooperation in order to get a reliable picture 
of approaches taken by regulators to third party assurance schemes around the world. 
This invitation is sent to all participants at the Government-to-Government (G2G) meetings 
in Berlin and Houston and to addresses from the Head of Agencies (EU countries). 
The survey is conducted by dr. Tetty Havinga (Radboud University, the Netherlands). The G2G 
working group was involved in developing the questionnaire. Participants at the international 
G2G meeting in Houston in 2017 indicated a general willingness to participate in this survey. 
Please consult for more detailed information on the project www.ru.nl/foodgovernance  or 
contact the researcher with your questions (SurveyG2G@jur.ru.nl). 
Please use this link to the survey Click HERE. 
Your sincerely, 
 
Dr. Tetty Havinga, 
Law faculty, Radboud university, Nijmegen, Netherlands.  
T.Havinga@jur.ru.nl, phone 31243615915. 
 
Alternatively you may go to the survey by copying the following in your browser: 
[url to survey] 
 
If you know other persons that might have valuable information about the topic, please ask 
them to fill in the questionnaire by using the following link [link]. 
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Reminders 
A few weeks later the following reminder mail was sent to persons who did not answer the 
questionnaire: 
 
Dear [name], 
 
This is a kind reminder to my request to participate in the survey on public-private 
collaboration in food safety governance. The aim of this survey is to make an inventory of 
the existing forms of collaboration between public authorities responsible for food safety 
controls with private food safety assurance schemes and their experiences with these 
private schemes. Input from many officials from different countries is essential to provide a 
reliable picture of the issues that are at stake. I hope you will find the time to answer the 
questions before the end of August. Your cooperation is very much appreciated.  
This is the link to the survey [link]. 
More information on this survey is available at www.ru.nl/law/foodgovernance. Please 
send me an email if you have any questions (T.Havinga@jur.ru.nl). 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Dr. Tetty Havinga 
Law faculty, Radboud university, Nijmegen, Netherlands. T.Havinga@jur.ru.nl, phone 
31243615915 
 
Respondents who started answering the questionnaire without completing it were reminded 
by a mail with the following text: 
 
Dear [name], 
 
This is a kind reminder to complete the global survey on public-private collaboration in food 
safety governance. You started answering the questions but did not yet finalize the survey. I 
hope you will find the time to complete answering the questions before the end of August. 
After you answered all questions it would be helpful if you go to the last page of the survey 
to submit the questionnaire. Then I know that you are done and you will not receive 
reminders anymore.  
It may be not possible for you to answer all the questions in the survey. In that case, just 
answer ‘I don’t know’ or simply skip that question. Please submit the survey even if you can 
answer only some of the questions. 
Your cooperation is very much appreciated. 
This is the link to the survey [link]. 
The aim of this survey is to make an inventory of the existing forms of collaboration 
between public authorities responsible for food safety controls with private food safety 
assurance schemes and their experiences with these private schemes. Input from many 
officials from different countries is essential to provide a reliable picture of the issues that 
are at stake. I hope you will find the time to answer the questions before the end of August. 
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More information on this survey is available at www.ru.nl/law/foodgovernance. Please 
send me an email if you have any questions (T.Havinga@jur.ru.nl). 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Dr. Tetty Havinga 
Radboud University Nijmegen 
 
In a second reminder round only respondents from countries where no one answered the 
questions were reminded with the following text with specific reference to their country  
 
Dear [name] 
 
This is a kind reminder to participate in the global survey on public-private collaboration in 
food safety governance. The aim of this survey is to make an inventory of the existing forms 
of collaboration between public authorities responsible for food safety controls with 
private food safety assurance schemes and their experiences with these private schemes. 
Input from many officials from different countries is essential to provide a reliable picture 
of the issues that are at stake. So far input from [name country] is missing. I hope you will 
find the time to answer the questions before the end of August. Please let me know if you 
have any problems in answering the questions. 
Your cooperation is very much appreciated.  
 
This is the link to the survey [link]. 
 
More information on this survey is available at www.ru.nl/law/foodgovernance. Please 
send me an email if you have any questions (T.Havinga@jur.ru.nl). 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Dr. Tetty Havinga 
Radboud University Nijmegen 
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Questionnaire 
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Appendix 3 
Country Reports 
 
 
 
How private food safety controls play a role in official supervision is embedded in the national 
legal and regulatory system of a country. The research report discusses thematically how 
national food safety authorities take account of private programs. As a result, the 
relationship with the national legal and regulatory context remains mostly out of sight. For 
this reason, this appendix describes for ten countries the way in which private controls play 
a role within the national context in more detail. These descriptions are based on information 
provided on the website of the national food safety authority, the answers in the 
questionnaire, additional information provided in personal conversation or emails and other 
available documents. For most countries, the description is largely based on the agency’s 
website and a lot of text is more or less taken over from this website. 
In the choice of countries, I have strived for a large degree of variation: countries 
that collaborate with food safety assurance schemes (Belgium, Canada, Egypt, 
England, Ivory Coast, The Netherlands), countries that make use of accredited 
certification bodies or auditors (Belgium, New Zealand, United States), countries that 
use food safety assurance certificates at the level of food business inspections 
(Finland). The geographical distribution of the countries was also a point of attention. 
In particular, some African countries are in the middle of building a sound national 
food safety system (Egypt, Ivory Coast). Mexico is included as a country from Central 
America that cooperates with GFSI. Finally, the availability of information on the food 
system in a country was also a criterion.  
The draft text about a country has been sent to the respondent of that country 
with the request to check and correct my text. Unfortunately, I have not received a 
response from all countries. The text about six countries has been checked for 
correctness. 
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BELGIUM1 
 
Food Safety Legislation 
The European Union food legislation forms the legal basis in all EU Member States, including 
Belgium. The General Food Law and subsequent Regulations lay down the principles and the 
responsibilities of both food business operators and Member States. Belgium is a federal 
state. The Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain (FAVV-AFSCA) carries out controls 
on food, feed, animal and plant health at all stages of the food chain and is responsible for 
the preparation of process standards, risk evaluation, management and communication.  
FAVV-AFSCA implements a risk based control system of food establishments which is based 
on routine inspections and voluntary validation/certification of self-checking systems (SCS) 
through audits based on FAVV-AFSCA approved sector guides (GHP and HACCP). These audits 
can be performed by competent authority (CA) officials or delegated to external control 
bodies (CBs).   
Validation of self-checking systems 
All food establishments are legally required to install and implement a food safety 
management system based on good hygiene and HACCP principles.2 In Belgium this is called 
Système d’Autocontrôle/autocontrolesysteem (self-checking system). Food and feed 
business operators may voluntary opt to validate that they work with such a system. 
Operators who work with a system based on an approved sector Guide to good hygienic 
practice or a safety standard accepted as equivalent, can be audited by approved external 
control bodies or by FAVV-AFSCA. Self-checking systems, not based on an approved sector 
guide can only be validated by the FAVV-AFSCA. 
Although validation of the self-checking system is voluntary, the FAVV-AFSCA encourages 
operators to have their self-checking system validated. Validated self-checking systems can 
for instance entitle operators to a discount on their annual contribution to the FAVV-AFSCA 
and a reduced inspection frequency. Of all registered establishments, 16% has a fully 
validated self-checking system, the highest numbers are found in primary production (48%) 
and food processing (21%) (figures from 31 December 2016). Almost all validation audits are 
performed by external control bodies, less than 0.5% of the validations are due to an audit 
by FAVV-AFSCA. External audits partly replace FAVV-AFSCA inspections. FBOs with a 
validated SCS generally perform better than FBOs with a validated system (FAVV 2017). 
Recognition of control bodies 
FAVV-AFSCA has a procedure for the recognition of certification and control bodies to 
perform validation audits of self-checking systems.3 The control body needs to be accredited 
to audit an approved sector guide. The recognition procedure includes requirements for 
qualified and experienced auditors, independency of auditors, a written audit protocol, and 
record keeping. Auditors are required to apply FAVV-AFSCA checklists and report format. 
                                                     
1  This descriptive summary draws heavily on information provided on the website of the Belgian 
Competent Authority FAVV-AFSCA and includes literally citations from this source. 
2  Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, art 17). Royal Decree of 14 November 2003. 
3 http://www.afsca.be/professionnels/autocontrole/guides/oci/_documents/2017-11-16_PErken-
ning CIenKIv20170920FRbis.pdf 
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Recognised control bodies are required to inform FAVV-AFSCA immediately about serious 
non conformities (possible health risk) and business activities that are not registered with 
FAVV-AFSCA.  Audit results and audit plans are also shared with FAVV-AFSCA. The Belgian 
authority has approved 14 certification bodies to perform validation audits under particular 
conditions. The recognition is valid for three years during which the CB is participating in a 
monitoring program consisting of witness audits and headquarter audits. According to 
internal procedure each year at least two CB headquarter audits and two witness audits 
should be carried out; the actual number is higher. The performance of CBs is also evaluated 
during regular inspections. If an inspector identifies a non-compliance in a food business with 
a validated self-checking system, a procedure for partial assessment of the validated SCS 
must be carried out; non-compliances found in this assessment are forwarded to the FAVV-
AFSCA. 
Equivalence procedure and 80-20 rule 
There are currently two approaches in Belgium for taking private assurance schemes into 
account: the equivalence procedure and the 80-20 rule. 
In the Equivalence procedure, a certification program can be accepted by FAVV-AFSCA as 
being equivalent to an approved sector guide to good hygienic practice. A private assurance 
scheme owner must draw up an equivalence table between the scheme and the approved 
sector guide. This comparison must include the scope, the requirements for business 
operators, and the requirements for certification bodies. So far, FAVV-AFSCA has accepted 
three certification programs as being equivalent:  two Vegaplan Standards for primary 
production and the Feed Chain Alliance (FCA).4 A verification audit by a control body that is 
approved for the equivalent sector guide will (under certain conditions) bring the same 
advantages as an audit based on the sector guide: lower financial contribution and less 
frequent inspections.  
The 80-20 rule applies to food companies whose activities are not fully covered by an 
approved sector guide. In case less than 20% of the turnover is outside the scope of a sector 
guide, the FAVV-AFSCA accepts an audit of these residual activities based on BRC, IFS and 
FSSC 22.000. Conditions are that more than 80% of the activities are covered by a validation 
audit based on the approved sector guide and that there is no approved sector guide for the 
residual activities. In these circumstances, FAVV-AFSCA accepts the audit that is partly based 
on the sector guide and partly based on the certification program (BRC, IFS, FSSC 22000) to 
gain a bonus on the annual contribution which has to be paid to FAVV-AFSCA and reduced 
inspection frequency. 
 
Collaboration with private assurance schemes and private auditors 
The Belgian authorities have integrated private assurance systems predominantly through 
the framework of validation of FBO food safety management systems by external control 
bodies that are recognized by the authority. FAVV-AFSCA has a procedure to assess third 
party control bodies to perform validating audits. These third-party audits have to be based 
on an sector guide for good hygienic practice approved by FAVV-AFSCA. Alternatively, a 
program that has been accepted as being equivalent, may be applied. In some cases, an audit 
based on international food safety certification programs BRC, IFS and ISO 22000 (FSCC 
                                                     
4  http://www.favv-afsca.fgov.be/autocontrole-nl/equivalentie/ 
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22000) is accepted for limited activities outside the scope of a recognised sector guide. It is 
investigated if private assurance schemes can be better integrated in the Belgian risk based 
control system in the future. 
The performance of the private assurance systems and of external control bodies is 
monitored through information concerning the CBs performing the validation audits. CBs are 
subjected to a monitoring program as part of their recognition by FAVV-AFSCA to perform 
these audits. Routine inspections in food and feed establishments by FAVV-AFSCA are 
another source of information on the performance of private schemes and auditors. 
Sources 
Belac (2007) Specific provisions for the accreditation of certification bodies in the field of food 
safety management systems, Belac 2-405-FSMS-Rev 1-2007 (www.belac.fgov.be) 
European Commission (2017) Final report of a fact-finding mission carried out in Belgium 
from 05 September 2017 to 13 September 2017 in order to gather information 
concerning synergies of official controls with food business operators own-checks and 
third party certification schemes. DG(Sante) 2017-6064. 
FAVV (2005) Checklist kwalificatie inspecteurs en auditoren van keurings- en 
certificeringsinstellingen in het kader van het KB autocontrole 
FAVV (2012) Gedragscode voor de inspecteurs en controleurs van het Federaal Agentschap 
voor de Veiligheid van de Voedselketen 
FAVV (2013) Procedure voor de erkenning van certificerings- en keuringsinstellingen in het 
kader van het KB autocontrole 
FAVV (2017) Rapport d’activité 2016, Resulats globaux des controles; http://www.afsca.be/ 
rapportactivites/2016/inspections/resultatscontroles/ 
FAVV (2018) Equivalence de certains référentiels d'audit avec les guides d'autocontrôle 
http://www.favv-afsca.fgov.be/autocontrole-fr/equivalence/ 
Maudoux, J.-P., C. Saegerman, C. Rettigner, G. Houins, X. van Huffel & D. Berkvens (2006), 
Food safety surveillance through a risk based control programme: Approach employed 
by the Belgian Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain, Veterinary Quarterly 
28(4), 140-154. 
Website FAVV-AFSCA: http://www.favv-afsca.be/  
Answers questionnaire 
Additional information provided by FAVV-AFSCA on request 
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CANADA 
 
Food Safety Legislation 
Canada has a multi-layered governmental system dividing responsibilities for regulations and 
inspections between the federal, provincial and municipal governments (Hobbs et al 2002, p. 
78). This summary is limited to the federal level. Canada has modernized its food legislation 
with the replacement of a series of acts and regulations by the Safe Food for Canadians Act 
(2012, SFCA)5 and the Safe Food for Canadians Regulations (2018, SFCR).6 The SFCA 
strengthens food safety oversight for food that is traded interprovincially or internationally 
by increasing authorities for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), and requiring all 
domestic food producers as well as importers, to be licensed, have in place HACCP-based 
preventive controls plans and undertake traceability (CFIA 2015). Once the SFCA is fully in 
force (15 January 2019), all food in Canada within the mandate of the CFIA will be regulated 
by two federal legislative regimes — the SFCA and the Food and Drugs Act. The Food and 
Drugs Act provides overarching protection for consumers in Canada from foods that are 
unsuitable for consumption.  
HACCP control plan 
With the Safe Food for Canadians Regulations detailed prescriptions have been replaced by 
outcome-based regulations leaving industry the flexibility to select the best option to achieve 
the desired outcome. Most businesses will need to put in place preventive food safety 
controls and to document their food safety controls in a preventive control plan (PCP). A PCP 
is a written document that demonstrates how risks are identified and controlled based on 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles. The CFIA ‘recognizes that private 
certification schemes may play an important role in helping industry achieve food safety 
regulatory objectives, provided they can be assessed as being effective, credible and aligned 
with public policy objectives’ (CFIA 2017a).  
Food Safety Recognition Program 
Canada has set up a Food Safety Recognition Program (FSRP) ‘which provides government 
recognition of on-farm and post-farm food safety systems developed and implemented by 
national industrial organizations’ (CFIA 2013). The program is led by CFIA with the 
participation of provincial and territorial governments. The FSRP encourages national 
industry organizations to develop food safety systems in line with a systematic and 
preventive approach to food safety called Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP). 
The FSRP is a multi-step process that consists of a review, an assessment, the recognition and 
ongoing monitoring of the technical soundness and administrative effectiveness of national 
industry organizations' fully implemented food safety system. In 2013 Canadian chicken 
farmers were the first to achieve recognition under this program, the dairy farmers followed 
in 2016, and CanadaGAP in 2017. The assessment process is timely. For example the 
recognition process of CanadaGAP took from 2004 to 2017 and involved a technical review 
of the standard and the management system, third party audits to assess implementation 
                                                     
5  http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/S-1.1/index.html. 
6  SOR/2018-108. http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2018/2018-06-13/html/sor-dors108-eng. 
html. 
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and performance, and an evaluation of third party audits by Canadian government officials 
(CFIA 2017). April 2018, 14 other industry organizations are involved in the program, but have 
not achieved recognition yet. 
Private Certification Policy 
Certification under a private scheme that meets public law requirements should positively 
impact the risk-based strategy it uses to prioritize food businesses for inspection. CFIA’s 
Private Certification Policy includes an assessment process of private certification schemes 
to determine to what level federal legislated food safety requirements are met. The outcome 
of this process will inform CFIA’s risk-based planning and prioritization (CFIA 2017a, compare 
Zanabria et al 2018, 79). CFIA will consider certification to CFIA-Assessed Programs (FSRP), 
GFSI-recognized food safety schemes, ISO food safety standards, and HACCP certification 
schemes within its risk-based assessment continuum based on the assessment outcome. 
CFIA will assess other Private Certification Schemes to establish whether the Agency has 
confidence in the oversight structure, and by extension, the certification result. 
Inspections and enforcement 
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) verifies compliance of all food establishments 
with its legislative requirements. There is no separate regulatory and oversight regime for 
the meat industry. The type, frequency and extent of the inspection activities will be 
proportional to the risks that need to be managed (CFIA 2018).  The CFIA developed a risk 
assessment model for food establishments (Establishment-based Risk Assessment ERA, CFIA 
2017c). The ERA model takes into consideration typical food safety hazards, as well as 
mitigation factors and will be used to determine the level of oversight required. Three 
different groups of risks are included in the model: the inherent risks factors, mitigation 
factors and compliance factors. Mitigation factors represent the measures or strategies that 
a food establishment is using to reduce the inherent risk of a food safety issue. This includes 
the implementation of an internationally recognized private certification scheme (i.e. 
preventive control plan) and third party audits.  
Collaboration with private assurance schemes 
To summarize, the Canadian government assesses voluntary industry food safety programs 
and uses assessment outcomes to inform CFIA's risk-based planning and prioritization. More 
precisely, the CFIA takes account of certification of companies within the following programs 
when determining the level of risk: FSRP recognised systems (Chicken Farmers of Canada’s 
On-Farm Food Safety Program OFFSAP), Canadian Quality Milk, CanadaGAP), GFSI recognized 
schemes (GlobalGAP, BRC, IFS, FSSC22000, SQF), relevant ISO food safety standards and 
HACCP certification programs if the certification has been achieved under an accredited 
certification oversight structure in accordance with the International Accreditation 
Framework. Businesses are not required to become certified, but if they do it will factor into 
their risk characterization. Together with other risk factors (product and process risks, 
compliance history, etcetera) CFIA may adjust the frequency, duration and scope of 
inspection. 
The CFIA and provincial and territorial governments are involved in the development of 
industry food safety programs under the Food safety recognition program. The CFIA is not 
involved in the development and oversight of international programs (GFSI, ISO, HACCP); 
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CFIA has assessed the oversight structure of these programs based on accredited third party 
certification and concluded that it is credible and robust.  
Private assurance systems do not replace official controls. The outcome of the assessment 
process of a private assurance system does not constitute any formal approval, recognition 
or endorsement by the CFIA and the CFIA retains the right to exercise its regulatory 
authorities in all cases.  
Sources 
CFIA (2013) Food Safety Recognition Program, accessed 5 December 2017 at http://www.in-
spection.gc.ca/food/safe-food-production-systems/food-safety-enhancement-pro-
gram/recognition-program/eng/1299860970026/1299861042890. 
CFIA (2015) Safe Food for Canadians Act: An overview, accessed 18 September 2018 
athttp://inspection.gc.ca/about-the-cfia/acts-and-regulations/regulatory-
initiatives/sfca/overview/eng/1339046165809/1339046230549 . 
CFIA (2017a), Private Certification Policy, accessed 18 September 2018 at http:// 
www.inspection.gc.ca/about-the-cfia/accountability/consultations-and-engagement/ 
regulatory-risk-based-oversight/private-certification-
policy/eng/1452808755126/1452808821799. 
CFIA (2017b), CanadaGAP program receives full government recognition accessed 5 
December 2017 at http://www.inspection.gc.ca/about-the-cfia/the-cfia-chronicle-
edition-3/canadagap-successfully-completes-the-canadian-food/eng/1509030448145/ 
1509030448497 
CFIA (2017c) The Establishment-based Risk Assessment accessed 18 September 2018 at 
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/about-the-cfia/accountability/inspection-
modernization/era-model/eng/1487771637766/1487771638453  
CFIA (2018) Regulatory Compliance accessed 19 September 2018 at http://www. Inspec-
tion.gc.ca/food/sfcr/regulatory-compliance/eng/1528322304931/1528322305 274 
Hobbs, Jill.E., Andrew Fearne and John Spriggs (2002), ‘Incentive structures for food safety 
and quality assurance: an international comparison’, Food control 13 (2), 77-81. 
Zanabria, Romina, Manon Racicot, Mathieu Cormier et al (2018) ‘Selection of risk factors in 
the Canadian Food Inspection Agency risk assessment inspection model for food 
establishments’, Food microbiology 75, 72-81. 
Answers questionnaire 
Additional information provided by CFIA on request 
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EGYPT 
 
Legislative context 
Egypt has initiated an ambitious project aiming at modernization of the assurance of food 
safety. In January 2017, new food legislation was put in place and a new national food safety 
authority was established.7  The National Food Safety Authority (NFSA) is an independent 
body that aims to protect consumer health by ensuring that the food produced, 
manufactured, distributed and traded in the market meets the highest safety and health 
standards. 
Egypt did not have a unified regulatory authority. Legislation governing food safety was/is 
very old dating back to the 1940s-1960s. New scientific insights are not included and the 
multiple laws and regulations have some overlap, inconsistencies and gaps. The system of 
food control has many weaknesses including the many regulators, absence of registration of 
companies and inspection results, limited specialization and training for inspectors and low 
salaries for workers. Moreover, food controls rely on sampling (small number). From 2008 
food and drink manufactories are obliged to implement a food safety management system 
compatible with ISO 22000 or HACCP.8 However, a system to verify the application of modern 
food safety systems such as HACCP and ISO 22000 is missing. 
The new law states that NFSA shall exclusively assume all responsibilities and jurisdiction of 
all ministries, governmental organizations and municipalities related to the regulation and 
supervision of food safety. The new law also assigned many responsibilities and powers to 
NFSA. The mandate of the new NFSA is broad and ambitious and includes setting food safety 
standards, inspection and licensing, preventing fraud, risk assessment, analysis and 
management, food traceability. Primary production is excluded from the mandate. However, 
NFSA expects their mandate of traceability will enable to expand controls to raw materials. 
During the transitional period, old laws will gradually be replaced, food safety inspectors 
from different departments, governmental agencies and municipalities will be transferred to 
the new authority and training programs will be implemented. The new regulations will be 
based on Codex. When Codex is absent NFSA will look at EU Regulations. The old system will 
gradually be taken over by the NFSA. 
Industry and private food safety assurance 
The private sector was one of the drivers for change, they were pushing for a uniform food 
authority in Egypt. Food industry and trade is represented with three members on the NFSA 
Board. The role of private certification programs and audits has not been decided yet. 
Involvement of private actors in food control will be considered, in particular because it 
would be very difficult for the government to cover all farms and food establishments. A 
layered surveillance system is envisaged in which a third party conducts inspections on focal 
                                                     
7  Law number 1/2017 establishing the National Food Safety Authority on Monday 2, January 
2017.  The Law was published in Official Gazette on January 10, 2017. www.nfsa.gov.eg 
(22/11/2017) translated with google translate. 
8  Decree no 757 issued by the Minister of Commerce and Industry in 2008. 
http://www.nfsa.gov.eg/(S(4la0pi5ujqfc4mogskeuzfhj))/App_PP/DeskTop/App_Web/App_Cust
om/1/Default.aspx?TabID=14200001. 
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points (clusters of producers) resulting in a group certification, and the third party is in turn 
monitored by the government. 
Currently, private food safety certification schemes are only applied for the export and 
private controls are not always accurate and vulnerable for fraud. The NFSA has published a 
white list for export on its website. On the list are certified companies supervised by the NFSA 
to ensure compliance with food safety standards and requirements. Even companies that are 
not on this white list are allowed to export food. 
Sources 
www.nfsa.gov.eg (English pages and Arab pages with google translate) 
Egypt Establishes the National Food Safety Authority (2017), Newsletter Sharkaway & 
Sarhan, Issue 87, 22 February 2017, http://www.sharkawylaw.com/1693-2/ (accessed 
22/11/2017) 
Khalid Hasan (2016) Can new food safety law stop Egypt's 'donkey slaughter mafia'? 
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/egypt-food-safety-regulations-
new-law-disease-beef.html (accessed 22/11/2017) 
Answers questionnaire 
Interview 
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FINLAND 
 
Food Safety Legislation 
As an EU Member State, Finnish food laws and regulations are largely determined by the 
European Union regulations and directives. Finland has a decentralized system laid down in 
the Finnish Food Act (23 /2006 amended 352/2011).9 Evira, the Finnish Food Safety Authority 
operates at the central level and has an advisory role. Tasks assigned to Evira include among 
others controlling slaughterhouses, predicting and managing risks, and the assessment of 
guides to Good Hygiene Practice (Food Act 2006). Evira is responsible for the national food 
safety control programme, covering the food chain from farm to fork.  
The execution of the control programme is the responsibility of a number of agencies, 
including Evira itself and Finnish customs at the national level. Evira encourages food 
business operators to formulate quality and social compliance systems, and directs the 
enforcement of legislation by developing control programs and by issuing guidelines. At 
regional level, the six Regional State Administrative Agencies oversee the execution of 
controls by the municipal environmental health control authorities. Although the obligations 
of the Food Act and other food legislation are binding directly on the municipalities, there is 
no legal obligation on them to act on Evira’s instructions, guidelines and recommendations. 
Inspection and enforcement 
Municipalities are autonomous in making inspections (except for slaughterhouses). Evira 
formulated a guideline for risk classification and inspection frequency of food 
establishments. Local food control units are legally required to have in place a quality system 
documenting control procedures. However, in 2010 (4 years after this requirement became 
mandatory) only 41% of local food control units had a quality system in place (Tähkäpää et 
al 2013:307). Moreover, quality systems (and inspection fees) may vary between different 
local authorities.  
Meat inspection is performed by a veterinary inspector of Finnish Food Safety Authority 
Evira, a Regional State Administrative Agency, municipality or the Åland Government. Meat 
inspection involves ante mortem and post mortem inspection. 
Finland has introduced a smiley system called Oiva to communicate inspection results to 
consumers. The Food Act requires FBOs and local authorities to publish the results of official 
controls.  Oiva is coordinated by Evira, the inspections are carried out by municipal food 
control authorities. Harmonisation of the local inspection practices throughout Finland is one 
of the objectives of Oiva, as all municipal food inspectors need to produce an inspection 
report in a format prescribed by Evira. The smiley system has made official controls more 
consistent throughout the country. 
All food sector employees are obligated to demonstrate their competence in food hygiene 
by proficiency testing. Food businesses need to ensure that employees who are handling 
non-packaged high perishable foodstuffs are in the possession of a Hygiene Proficiency 
Certificate (Food Act 23/2006, clause 27-28 and 78). Independently operating proficiency 
examiners authorized by Evira arrange testing and issuing of certificates. Evira tests the 
system as well as the activities of examiners. Local authorities inspect compliance with the 
                                                     
9  http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2006/en20060023.pdf. 
Havinga: Integration of private certification in governmental food controls 
 
 
76 
liability for hygiene proficiency. More than 1,100,000 hygiene passports (covering about 20%  
of the total Finnish population) have been issued (Evira 2018). 
Collaboration with Private assurance schemes 
Finland does not have a programme for assessing private assurance schemes or private 
auditors. Evira does not see any extra value in approving or assessing private assurance 
schemes as long as the results are taken into account in official controls. Evira has formulated 
instructions for regional authorities and for municipalities to take into account all kind of data 
including data of using private assurance schemes. A food business operator can use any 
scheme considered useful. The results are taken into account in inspections. Evira has 
developed a system for risk classification and inspection frequency . Food establishments are 
rated and classified in ten risk categories on the basis of their activities and volume. Using an 
assurance scheme is visible in the scoring. The risk class defines recommended inspection 
frequencies and the duration of inspection. Using an assurance scheme may lead into a 
possibility to get reduced inspection frequency. This approach is felt to be feasible and an 
easy way to benefit from private assurance schemes without a heavy burden of a program 
for accepting or recognizing schemes by the competent authority. The Finnish government 
wants to diminish the burden of bureaucracy. 
Future developments 
The Finnish Food Safety Authority, the Finnish Agency for Rural Affairs and a part of the 
National Land Survey of Finland's Centre for ICT Services become the Finnish Food Authority 
on 1 January 2019. Municipal reform and new arrangements in local government are 
expected to simplify official supervision structures. Third-party supervision and inspection 
activities will grow in significance. Securing food safety will be impossible without close 
international cooperation. Evira will continue to be part of European Union networks and 
global cooperation bodies within the sector (Evira 2016). 
Sources 
Evira (2016) Evira Strategy 2014-2020 https://www.evira.fi/en/about-evira/about-us/eviras-
strategy-20142020/operating-environment-and-coming-changes/ 
Evira (2018)  Safe and Delicious Finnish Food https://www.evira.fi/globalassets/tietoa-
evirasta/julkaisut/esitteet/elintarvikkeet/safe_and_delicious_finnish_food_english1. 
pdf.  
Finland. Country profile. Organisation of Official Controls. (2016) DG Health and Food safety 
Tähkäpää, Satu Tähkäpää, Mari Nevas, Maija Kallioniemi, Hannu Korkeala, Riitta Maijala, 
(2013) Control fees and quality systems have improved food control as perceived by 
local food control officers in Finland, Food Control 32, 304-308. 
https://www.evira.fi/  
Answers questionnaire 
Interview 
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IVORY COAST  
 
Background 
Since the early 2000s, Ivory Coast has paid attention to improving food safety. A report 
evaluating the effectiveness of sanitary controls and the food safety system concluded that 
Ivory Coast lacks a coordinated and reliable national system for securing food safety while 
the problems are great (Montet et all 2017). Food samples show high levels of 
contaminations by pathogens and there is an increase in food poisoning. The committee even 
concludes that ‘no food or water distributed [in the Ivorian markets] would be considered 
healthy by the European Union’ (Montet et all 2017, 371). Moreover, the quantity of food is 
a key issue. Problems include obsolete legislation, weak enforcement, multiple actors and 
lack of coordination and communication. Currently, a national food safety agency is being set 
up by FADCI-SSA with the support of the French government. The Food Safety Agency will be 
responsible for risk management, resort to the prime minister, and have a governance board 
consisting of members from the government, the private sector and civil society 
organizations. FADCI-SSA is organising training sessions to increase the capacity of the food 
chain operators to comply with food hygiene regulations and to sensitize consumer 
organisations and media to the notions of food safety. 
Food Safety Legislation 
Since 1985, Ivory coast has adopted more than 200 standards for agricultural and food 
products. The standards have been developed by the national standardization organization 
Codinorm. This forms a basic legislative and regulatory framework, but it is outdated and 
fragmented. Aspects of responsibility, traceability, food crisis and prevention are not covered 
(Montet et all 2017, 368). FADCI-SSA is asked to develop a modern constitutional and legal 
framework. 
Private assurance schemes 
Recognised accredited private assurance schemes are taken into account in the inspection 
policy because they contribute to compliance with regulations. The private controls verify 
compliance with food safety control plans validated by the authority. This applies to HACCP, 
ISO 22000, IFS, BRC and GlobalGAP certifications. It is mainly multinational companies that 
work with these private systems. The results of these companies in monitoring and control 
programs are generally good. These private assurance systems are too costly for small 
enterprises and the informal sector. Private certification should not be only in favour of 
international trade and export to the global North, but should instead also benefit consumers 
in the South. 
Sources 
Montet, D. et al (2017) The success story of the implementation of the national food safety 
agency in Ivory Coast, Egyptian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences 4, 366-371. 
http://firca.ci/ssa/ 
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MEXICO 
 
Food safety legislation 
The legal base of the Mexican food regulatory system is the General Health Law (Ley General 
de Salud). Additional laws are the Federal Law for Animal Health and the Federal Law for 
Plant Health. The law provides for two distinct types of standards. Official Mexican 
Norms (NOMs) are governmental mandatory rules (meat, pesticides, plant diseases). 
Mexican standards (NMX) are a set of voluntary references to determine the quality of goods 
and services.  
Mexico has established a framework for Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) based on 
preventive standards, verification, and certification programs for fresh produce and covers 
the full supply chain from growing through distribution. The Federal Departments of 
Agriculture – National Service for Agroalimentary Public Health, Safety, and Quality 
(SENASICA) – and Health – Federal Commission for the Protection from Sanitary Risks 
(COFEPRIS) work collaboratively to implement this GAP framework. SENASICA aims at 
reducing the risks in agricultural food products.  It does so, among other things, through the 
System for the Reduction of Contamination Risks (SRRC ). SRRC is an official voluntary scheme 
to ensure the reduction of physical, chemical and microbiological contamination in primary 
produce, through the application of Good Agricultural Practices. More than 10,000 
companies and producers are certified. 
Mexico has ‘developed strategies to strengthen its National Food Control System through the 
enforcement of Good Manufacturing Practices, which are mandatory for all fruit and 
vegetable growers and packing houses.’(US FDA- Mexico 2018, p. 4)  
Verification and Enforcement 
Verification of compliance with mandatory NOM standards (such as regarding hygienic 
practices) can be performed by private auditing and certification bodies.  
Producers who have successfully implemented the voluntary official program of pollution risk 
reduction (SRRC) while growing, harvesting and/or packing agricultural products (fruits and 
vegetables), livestock and aquaculture products can be certified by third parties authorized 
by SENASICA.  
México Calidad Suprema is a non-profit industry organization, with the goal of assisting the 
Mexican federal government to increase the competitiveness of Mexican food products in 
domestic and international markets through the promotion of quality and safety practices. It 
does this by providing training, information campaigns and managing the Mexico Supreme 
Quality Official Trademark (MCS). MCS is owned by the Mexican Federal Government. The 
certification indicates that products comply with the SRRC guidelines and that plant freezing 
and animal product processing comply with official food safety standards. The certification 
also relates to other forms of quality, such as color, size, weight, texture and packaging.  
Private auditors and advisors have to be recognised by Senasica. Every two years they need 
to be re-evaluated. Training on the official scheme for private auditors is provided by 
Senasica and by universities recognised by Senasica for this task. 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2018/01 
 
 
79 
Private assurance schemes 
In recent years both private and governmental organizations are engaged in benchmarking 
private schemes against the official voluntary scheme SRRC. This process is still going on. In 
2017 no private schemes had been recognised. If it is established that a private scheme 
includes all requirements of the official scheme, private certification could also include 
certification for the governmental scheme. The idea is that after a private scheme is 
recognised as equivalent to the governmental scheme, a private certification body could 
issue a certificate against the recognised scheme as well as the certificate for the official 
scheme. However, the government is not so much planning to recognize private assurance 
schemes as to allow third party certification of the voluntary official scheme. The Mexican 
governmental agencies do not have enough capacity to maintain surveillance on all 9,000 
growers and packing plants that work under the official program. Collaboration with private 
auditors could also prevent certification costs for firms (as companies do not have to pay 
double for two certifications). 
Compliance with the regulations and requirements of the Safe Quality Food private 
assurance scheme (SQF) and the standard for fruits, vegetables and aquaculture  
MexicoG.A.P. allows Mexican producers to have the certifications for food safety and quality 
required for access to national and international markets. SQF and MCS are collaborating on 
combined certification audits. 
March 2017, a partnership between Senasica and the Global food Safety Initiative (GFI) was 
presented. This partnership includes collaboration of Senasica with the local GFSI group 
(training, benchmarking schemes) and with the national retail association ANTAD and the 
American Food Marketing Institute (SQF). The GFSI and  Direccion General de Normas have 
established guidelines for the certification of programmes and development of private food 
safety systems recognized by the GFSI. This voluntary Mexican norm was published by El 
Diario Oficial de la Federacion de Mexico in July 2018.10 
Sources 
GFSI (2018) GFSI and DGN Establish the First Mexican Voluntary Norm on Food Safety, GFSI 
News 2018/07/26. https://www.mygfsi.com/news-resources/news/press-
releases/1423-gfsi-and-dgn-establish-the-first-mexican-voluntary-norm-on-food-
safety.html 
Leon, Marco A. and Esmeralda Paz (2014) A perspective of food safety laws in Mexico J Sci 
Food Agric  94: 1954–1957 (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI 10.1002/jsfa.6430 
López-García, Rebeca  (2016) Food Law in Mexico: Regulatory Framework and Public Policy 
Strategies to Address the Obesity Crisis in Latin America. In: Steier G., Patel K. (eds) 
International Food Law and Policy. Springer, Cham. DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
319-07542-6_33 
U.S. FDA-MEXICO PRODUCE SAFETY PARTNERSHIP. A DYNAMIC PARTNERSHIP IN ACTION 
(2018) 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/InternationalInteragencyCoordination/Internat
ionalCooperation/UCM610866.pdf  
 
                                                     
10  NMX-F-804-SCFI-2018, http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5530212&fecha=05/07/ 
2018.  
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Websites of Senasica (https://www.gob.mx/senasica ), México Calidad Suprema 
(http://www.mexicocalidadsuprema.org/), SQF (https://www.sqfi.com/search-
results/#!/mexico/page=1 ), ANCE (https://www.ance.org.mx/), FDA (https:// 
www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/Agreements/MemorandaofUnderstanding/ucm1
07608.htm)  
Answers questionnaire 
Additional information provided by Senasica on request 
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THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Food Safety Legislation 
European food legislation is the legal basis in the Netherlands. The primary responsibility for 
food safety lies with companies producing and trading food. Businesses in all links in the food 
chain are obliged to comply with all food safety regulations including general hygiene 
requirements. One of the major obligations on food business operators is that they have to 
develop a risk management system based on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) principles.11 To comply with this requirement a food business operator has two 
options: develop and implement its own company-specific food safety management system 
or adopt an applicable Guide to Good Hygienic Practice (whether or not specially modified). 
Two ministries are in charge of policy making and legislation. They act as central competent 
authorities. The Netherlands Food and Consumer Products Safety Authority (Nederlandse 
Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit – NVWA) is the competent authority responsible for monitoring 
compliance and enforcement of food laws and regulations. Most official controls on 
compliance with legal food safety requirements, are performed by NVWA inspectors. Some 
controls are delegated to other independent administrative public bodies (examples include 
controls on dairy, eggs, organic food). In such cases, NVWA monitors the supervision by those 
designated agencies. In the Netherlands, local governments are not involved in food safety 
controls. 
Assessment of assurance schemes 
The NVWA has developed two programs to take private assurance schemes into account for 
supporting official controls: a program focussing at private food safety management control 
systems (called POCs) in the hotel and catering sector, artisanal businesses, retail and 
healthcare institutions, and a general program for the assessment of third party private 
assurance quality certification schemes (called ‘ketenborging’ – chain assurance). 
Private-body inspection systems (POCs)  
Private assurance systems that monitor compliance with guides to good hygienic practice by 
artisan, non-industrial food business operators can apply for recognition by the NVWA. The 
procedure starts with assessing whether the system meets the criteria. Only schemes based 
on recognized sectoral guides of good hygiene practice fall within the scope of this program.12 
This means that only companies that use a recognized guide without their own modifications, 
can participate in such a system. The assessment procedure starts off with talks and 
discussions with the scheme owner to map and test the methodology of the private system. 
Aspects that feature prominently in these meetings are the norms that are assessed upon 
inspection, the research methodology used (e.g. sample taking, witness inspections), the way 
questions are asked, the training of inspectors, and the ways in which the system is reviewed 
and updated. Inspections should be complete and cover all elements of basic requirements 
                                                     
11  Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
hygiene of foodstuffs. HACCP stands for Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point. 
12  These guides to good hygienic practice are developed on a sectoral basis by the respective 
representative industry bodies and submitted to government for formal approval, after which 
they form the basis for NVWA inspections in the sector concerned. See Havinga 2014. 
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and HACCP. Inspections may not be restricted to a part of the hygiene regulations (save re-
inspections). Other criteria are the frequency of controls and whether these are 
unannounced, and whether particular requirements are considered to be essential (failing 
such a requirement would result in suspension, withdrawal or rejection of the certificate). 
After meetings and desk research, NVWA performs an audit and checks the actual 
performance and reliability of the system. October 2018 the NVWA has accepted 9 POCs. 
Approved Assurance Schemes 
October 2018, NVWA has accepted the following schemes under the POC program: Houwers 
Groep Zelfcontrolesysteem, Sensz BV Waarborg Voedselveiligheid, Bureau de Wit Keurmerk 
Voedselveiligheid,13 Kroonenburg Advies Goed & Groen, Stichting Voedsel Veiligheid 
Inspectie Wageningen Hygiëneinspecties, Eurofins Food Safety Solutions Zekerheid in Veilig 
Voedsel, Diversey Consulting Zelfcontrolesysteem, GGD Amsterdam, and Normec Foodcare 
zelfcontrolesysteem.14 Most are systems that work exclusively in the Netherlands. The 
membership of the approved assurance schemes (POCs) includes companies in the hotel and 
catering industry, healthcare, retail and artisan production. At present, the number of food 
businesses that participate in a POC system is relatively small (NVWA 2018, European 
Commission 2018: 4).  
NVWA monitors and verifies the performance of accepted POCs, this includes verification 
inspections of certified firms, administrative controls of inspection reports and audits of the 
headquarters of the scheme. 
 
‘In 2017, particular efforts were made to improve and harmonise working methods. In 
addition, three administrative controls and three audits of POCs were conducted. A fact-
finding mission by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Food 
Safety issued a positive opinion on the POC system and endorsed the added value for 
monitoring.’ (NVWA 2018) 
 
The European mission team also noted that membership in these systems provides 
disadvantages to the food businesses: it is costly and a higher compliance score is required 
(European Commission 2018, p.5, p.13). 
Private assurance quality certification schemes 
Next to the POC program, the NVWA has a program for adapted official controls for accepted 
private assurance quality schemes. This program is not limited to schemes controlling 
conformity with recognized guides for good hygiene and is also available for third party 
certification schemes for food manufacturers, primary food produce and feed industry 
sectors. In response to the horse meat fraud in 2013, a Taskforce with members from the 
government and the food industry sought for opportunities to avoid such incidents in the 
future. The Taskforce concluded that the food industry should tighten quality assurance 
systems within dedicated supply chains. The Taskforce formulated criteria for acceptance of 
quality assurance schemes by the governmental authorities (Ketenborging 2017). The NVWA 
                                                     
13  See Verbruggen & Havinga 2015 for a detailed description of this POC. 
14  www.nvwa.nl https://www.nvwa.nl/onderwerpen/kwaliteitssystemen-zelfcontrolesystemen-
en-toezicht-nvwa/horeca-ambacht-zorginstellingen-retail-voedselveiligheid-haccp/geaccepteer-
de-kwaliteitssystemen-horeca-ambacht-zorginstellingen-retail (consulted 31-10-2018). See also 
European Commission 2018: 4. 
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is responsible for the assessment of schemes that apply for these recognition. The procedure 
includes checking on the formal criteria such as compliance with relevant ISO standards, 
accreditation by an EA (European co-operation for Accreditation) affiliated accreditation 
organization, inclusion of legal requirements, requirements for product integrity/prevention 
of fraud, requirements for certification bodies and auditors, measures for safeguarding 
compliance with legislation by participating firms. A scheme that not covers all legal 
requirements applicable in the sector, can be accepted under this program as long as it is 
clear what requirements are covered and what requirements are outside the scope of the 
scheme. After this initial stage, the NVWA will meet with the scheme owners to discuss the 
working of the system in more detail. This includes issues such as unannounced inspections, 
sharing of information and difference between NVWA inspection results and inspection 
results of certification bodies within the scheme.  Assessment of a scheme is a lengthy 
procedure. October 2018, six assurance schemes have been accepted under this program.15 
Five other schemes are still in the procedure. 
Accepted third party certification schemes 
October 2018, NVWA has accepted three assurance schemes for food safety in food 
production: BRC Global Standard for Food Safety, IFS Food, and FSSC22000. These 
transnational food safety schemes are recognized by the Global Food Safety Initiative and 
are used by the majority of food manufacturers in the Netherlands. The NVWA has also 
accepted RiskPlaza, this scheme aims to control food safety hazards in raw materials and 
ingredients supplied to companies active in the food sector (see Verbruggen & Havinga 2015 
for a description of RiskPlaza). The remaining two accepted schemes focus on the animal feed 
sector: Feed Chain Alliance, and the GMP+ Feed Certification scheme.16 Five schemes are still 
in the assessment procedure, three of these are assurance schemes for primary production: 
GLOBALG.A.P., Stichting Kwaliteitsgarantie Vleeskalversector (Foundation for Quality 
Guarantee of the Veal Sector), and IKB Nederland Varkens (Integrated Pork Chain 
Management). The other two schemes are focused on animal feed, EFISC (European Feed 
and Food Ingredient Safety Certification) and FAMI QS (feed). The NVWA is monitoring the 
performance of accepted third party certification schemes and aims at improvement of the 
performance of the schemes. 
Inspection and enforcement 
‘The NVWA supervises businesses operating within the food supply chain and monitors their 
compliance with the legal requirements for safe food. This supervision covers the entire food 
supply chain, focusing on both plant-based and animal-based food production. It therefore 
extends far beyond merely monitoring food sold to the consumer and served in hotel and 
catering establishments’ (NVWA 2018a, p4). The guiding principle of NVWA supervision 
policy is being ‘lenient whenever possible and though when required’ (NVWA 2018a, p6).  
The NVWA supervision is largely risk-based by determining what the greatest risks are, where 
in the chain intervention is needed and what results this should have (NVWA 2018a, p.20, 
23). Supervision includes three layers: checks and sampling, inspections, and audits (HACCP 
system supervision). NVWA has adapted supervision for food business operators that fulfill 
the requirements of an accepted assurance system. 
                                                     
15  https://ketenborging.nl/kwaliteitsschemas-en-status/ (31-10-2018). 
16  https://ketenborging.nl/kwaliteitsschemas-en-status/ (31 oktober 2018). 
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Food firms participating in an accepted POC and where signals of non-compliance are absent 
may be eligible for reduced NVWA supervision. Compared to official controls, the level of 
required regulatory compliance is higher in case of a POC: firms will only be considered 
compliant when they meet 80% of all requirements (while the NVWA will not take 
enforcement measures when there is 60% compliance). Reduced supervision means that the 
POC carries out the controls and the NVWA only inspects the establishments concerned if it 
receives a report or complaint. However, the NVWA regularly assesses the reliability and 
performance of the POC assurance system through audits and inspections.  
The NVWA is exploring what form of adapted supervision of food businesses participating in 
an accepted third party certification scheme is best. This is done on a case-by-case basis and 
could include a reduction in the frequency of inspections, shorter inspections, inspections 
focused on specific issues, remote inspections and alternative controls. Also possibilities for 
information exchange are being explored. This form of cooperation between NVWA and third 
party assurance schemes is still under development. 
Sources 
European Commission (2018) Final report of a fact-finding mission carried out in the 
Netherlands from 07 November 2017 to 15 November 2017 in order to gather 
information concerning synergies of official controls with food business operators own-
checks and third party certification schemes. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, DG(Sante) 2017-6071. 
Havinga, Tetty  (2014) National variations in the implementation and enforcement of 
European food hygiene regulations. Comparing the structure of food controls and 
regulations between Scotland and the Netherlands, Recht der Werkelijkheid 35, 3, p. 32-
53. 
Ketenborging.nl (2017) Criteria for supervision support through private quality systems 
https://ketenborging.nl/wp-content/uploads/EN-version-Criteria-for-supervision-
support-through-private-quality-systems-25-9-17.pdf  
(https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/richtlijnen/2017/09/25/criteria-voor-
toezichtondersteuning-door-private-kwaliteitssystemen ) 
NVWA (2018a) The first Food safety statement, NVWA https://english.nvwa.nl/ 
documents/consumers/food/safety/documents/food-safety-statement  
NVWA (2018b) MANCP. Multi Annual National Control Plan The Netherlands Annual 
Report 2017. https://english.nvwa.nl/documents/nvwa/organisation/annual-reports/ 
documents/mancp-multi-annual-national-control-plan-the-netherlands-annual-report-
2017  
Verbruggen, Paul and Tetty Havinga (2015) Food Safety Meta-Controls in the Netherlands, in 
European Journal of Risk Regulation 6, 4, p. 512-524.  
Websites of NVWA https://www.nvwa.nl/, and Stichting ketenborging, https:// 
ketenborging.nl/  
Answers questionnaire 
Additional information provided by NVWA on request 
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NEW ZEALAND 
 
Food safety legislation 
The Food Act 2014 sets requirements to achieve the safety and suitability of food for sale, 
maintain and improve confidence in New Zealand’s food safety regime and provide for risk-
based measures that minimise and manage risks to public health. The Food Act came into 
force on 1 March 2016. It takes a new risk-based approach to managing food safety and 
introduced a sliding scale. Businesses that are higher risk, from a food safety point of view, 
will operate under more stringent food safety requirements and checks than lower-risk food 
businesses. The Act applies to all food business operators trading in food. Businesses must 
have the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) approved food safety measures that are based 
on the level of physical, chemical or biological risk.  
Most food businesses are required to operate under a food control plan or a national 
programme. Medium and low risk businesses can choose to operate under a national 
programme or under a food control plan (to personalise the way they manage food safety). 
Manufacturers of high-risk foods will need to develop a food control plan. A food control plan 
(FCP) is a comprehensive plan for managing food safety. MPI has developed two templates 
to create a FCP, suitable for food retail businesses that prepare or make and sell food and for 
food service businesses, such as restaurants and takeaways, and for cheesemakers. There 
are approved industry-developed templates for age care providers, bakeries, and Lone Star 
restaurants. MPI has evaluated GlobalGAP, NewZealandGAP and BRC for horticulture for 
approval as template food control plans for businesses in the horticulture sector.17 A business 
can also make its own unique Food Control Plan, a custom FCP.  
Evaluation and verification of Food control plans 
Custom Food Control Plans need to be independently evaluated before registration. The 
evaluation is an independent external assessment of the validity of a FCP. The food business 
has to contract a recognised evaluator to perform this task.  
To be recognised as a FCP evaluator a person needs to be appropriately skilled, reputable 
and of good character, able to maintain an appropriate degree of impartiality and 
independence, and able to meet the requirements of any regulations. Some persons 
recognised as an evaluator are employed with private organisations such as AsureQuality 
Limited or Eurofins, others are self-employed. Some recognised evaluators are employed 
with the Ministry of primary industries (MPI). MPI checks the food control plan and 
evaluation report before registration and, if everything meets requirements, issues a 
registration certificate.  
All food businesses need to contract a verifier recognised by the MPI. The verifier will check 
that the business is following the rules and keeping records, and provides feedback on areas 
that need improvement.  Agencies recognised for verification are private people or 
organisations, and local councils. These verifiers report to MPI. The MPI Verification 
                                                     
17  https://www.mpi.govt.nz/news-and-resources/consultations/horticulture-sector-section-40-
applications/ (12-9-2018). 
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Services18 verifies that premises processing meat, seafood and other animal products follow 
appropriate risk management and food safety programmes. Local councils and independent 
verifiers set their own fees. The frequency of verification visits depends on how successfully 
food safety is managed (compliance record) and the risk level of the activity. Most food 
premises are checked every 3-18 months. The MPI website provides a list of recognised 
agencies for verification and evaluation services.  
Private assurance schemes 
New Zealand is taking private assurance systems into account in its official controls. The 
government’s regulatory philosophy is that the food/feed operator is the primary entity for 
ensuring that products are safe and suitable. The role of the government is to define 
minimum standards, define the level of due diligence expected, undertake approvals where 
necessary, conduct an appropriate level of verification that the standards are being applied, 
monitor whether the application of the standards is effective at achieving the public policy 
objective and conduct compliance and enforcement actions when required. The key issue for 
the Ministry is whether the company can objectively show it is delivering on its respon-
sibilities. Third party audits are just one way to demonstrate good performance. The MPI has 
officially recognised two private assurance schemes: GAP for fresh vegetables, fruits and 
cereals, and FSSC22000 for dairy, fish and sea fruits.  
It is expected that GlobalGAP, NewZealandGAP and BRC for horticulture will be approved by 
MPI as industry-made template FCPs. Verification of compliance with the scheme can be 
done in the certification audit.  
Enforcement 
If there are problems with a food business, a food safety officer may get involved. Food safety 
officers are responsible for enforcing the Food Act. They investigate non-compliance and 
complaints regarding the safety and suitability of food. All food safety officers are employed 
by either MPI or a local council. Some food safety officers also work as verifier and/or 
evaluator. 
Usually, minor offences can be dealt with by food safety officers providing suitable advice. If 
more serious issues are found a graduated response is taken. Officers may issue directions, 
infringement notices, or for particularly serious offences initiate a prosecution. 
Sources 
http://mpi.govt.nz/food-safety 
http://mpi.govt.nz/food-safety/food-act-2014   
https://www.mpi.govt.nz/food-safety/food-act-2014/information-for-regulators-and-veri-
fiers/  
http://www.foodsafety.govt.nz/registers-lists/food-act-2014-recognised-agencies/index. 
htm?setup_file=fa2014-recognised-agencies-ssi.setup.cgi&rows_to_return=2000&sub-
mitsearch=Search  
                                                     
18  MPI Verification Services is accredited to ISO17020 and is a recognised agency under the Animal 
Products Act (1999). It is audited annually by International Accreditation New Zealand (IANZ). 
The export meat sector accounts for 80% of the Verification Service's activities. 
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https://www.mpi.govt.nz/news-and-resources/consultations/horticulture-sector-section-
40-applications/  
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UNITED KINGDOM (ENGLAND) 
 
Food Safety Legislation 
European food legislation is the legal basis in the UK to date. The devolved governments of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have varying degrees of responsibility in relation to 
controls in feed and food (European Commission 2015). This summary is focussed on England 
and does not provide systematic information on the other parts of the UK.  
The Food Safety Act 1990 provides the framework for food legislation in England, and sets 
out the main responsibilities for food businesses. The Food Standards Act 1999 established 
the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and gave it formal powers to set standards for, and monitor 
and audit Local Authorities feed and food law enforcement. FSA is the central competent 
authority responsible for the delivery of official controls on feed and food safety and 
standards legislation. The responsibility for official controls and inspections is shared 
between Local Authorities (LA) and the FSA. The actual inspections on registered food and 
feed establishments are carried out by enforcement officers of local authorities; only 
particular industries are inspected by the FSA (e.g. meat, dairy). FSA provides local authorities 
with guidance and frameworks to ensure they are consistent when enforcing the relevant 
laws for food and animal feed. These include Codes of Practice, Framework Agreements and 
Practice Guidance. FSA also provides training for local enforcement officers and audits local 
authorities enforcement activities. 
Assessment of assurance schemes 
Assurance schemes in the animal feed and food hygiene at the level of primary production 
sectors can apply to become approved by the FSA under the Earned Recognition Program. 
The procedure to ensure that scheme standards map to legislative requirements and that 
scheme controls are robust, are available on the FSA website (Benson 2017). FSA assesses 
the scheme against criteria concerning six themes: standard setting, compliance and 
certification, assessment process, assessor authorization/competence, standard mapping 
and, data sharing and communication. The scheme should cover all applicable legislative 
requirements, clearly describe compliance and processes for auditing and review, and ensure 
a clear, proportional, consistent and documented certification process by accredited 
certification bodies and qualified and experienced auditors. The scheme must ensure that up 
to date information on membership of the scheme is available and that FSA and local 
authorities are informed immediately if an immediate threat to public health is identified. 
Audits must review conformity with all applicable standards and must include a visual 
inspection of the site, observation of operations and examination of records. Where possible 
audits should be unannounced or at short notice. In fact only approximately 5% of the audits 
for approved schemes are unannounced (European commission 2018, p 19 par. 82). After 
approval of the scheme, the collaborative arrangements are formalised and laid down in a 
Memorandum of Understanding. 
FSA will monitor approved assurance schemes. This includes review against the Earned 
Recognition requirements, data exchange, levels of compliance, regular meetings between 
FSA and the scheme, and checking the quality of audits (including local authorities sample 
checks of qualifying businesses).  
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Figure: The process for gaining Earned Recognition and the verification process (Benson 2017, 
p. 7) 
 
 
Currently, assessment of assurance schemes has only been undertaken in primary food 
production and animal feed production;  schemes for food manufacturers, wholesalers and 
places where food is sold or consumed (e.g. shops, restaurants, takeaways, hospitals) have 
not been assessed. FSA has investigated the potential for earned recognition to apply to food 
manufacturers with a BRC Global Standard for Food Safety certificate (Robinson 2017). It was 
concluded that there is sufficient commonality between the BRC Global Standards food 
hygiene audit processes and official controls to merit the scoping of options for recognising 
the assurance provided by a BRC Global Standards certificate. Concerns were expressed 
about the different audit approach, limited access to audit reports, and gaps in the coverage 
of legal requirements. 
Approved Assurance Schemes 
FSA has approved a small number of assurance schemes for Earned Recognition. FSA signed 
MoU for Earned Recognition with the Agricultural Industries Confederation (AIC) and Assured 
Food Standards (Red Tractor Assurance). The approved schemes include three AIC schemes  
in the feed industry: Feed Materials Assurance Scheme, Trade Assurance Scheme for 
Combinable Crops, Universal Feed Assurance Scheme, and six Red Tractor Assurance Farm 
standards which cover food safety, traceability, animal welfare and environmental protection 
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(Beef & Lamb, Crops & Sugar, Beet, Dairy, Fresh produce, Pigs, Poultry).19 Together, these 
approved schemes cover a very large part of the primary production sectors. The AIC 
schemes represent about 95% of the feed placed on the UK Market, whereas the Red tractor 
schemes represent about 75-80 % of the total UK primary food production (European 
commission 2016, 2-3).  
Earned recognition 
Earned recognition is a framework for reducing the frequency and type of official controls on 
businesses that demonstrate sustainable compliance. Businesses that are compliant 
members of a FSA recognised assurance scheme qualify for Earned Recognition and benefit 
from a reduced frequency of official inspections. In addition to certification to a recognized 
assurance scheme, there are two other ways for a company to obtain Earned recognition 
status.  
A second way is that the level of compliance of a business is taken into account in the Food 
Establishment Intervention Rating Schemes. There are different risk scoring systems for food 
hygiene, food standards and animal feed law to establish the frequency of official controls. 
Feed businesses that are not a member of a FSA approved assurance scheme that 
demonstrate a broad level of current compliance with relevant feed law qualify for type 2 
earned recognition. This is included in the matrix to calculate types and frequencies of 
inspections. The earned reduction for type 2 is substantial, although smaller than 
membership of an approved assurance scheme (type 1) (Feed Law Code of Practice 2018, 37, 
52-53). 
For food establishments (except primary production), the food hygiene scoring system to 
establish the frequency of official controls is based on the potential hazard, the compliance 
level, and the confidence in the management procedures (Food Law Code of Practice 2017, 
98-109). FBOs with a broad level of compliance and appropriate food safety management 
and control procedures receive a lighter regulatory touch.  In particular, food businesses that 
are certified under a third party certification scheme (which has not been recognised by FSA) 
can demonstrate that they apply robust management and control procedures (European 
Commission  2017, p. 10, par 30). However, the factor ‘potential hazard’ weighs heavier than 
good compliance and own controls together. For an establishment producing high risk food, 
membership of a non-recognised third party assurance scheme and good compliance does 
not substantially influence the final risk categorisation (European commission 2017, p 10, par 
32-33).  
The third way to obtain earned recognition is through a partnership of a business or group of 
businesses with a so-called ‘primary authority’ (FSA 2018; European commission 2018, p. 7, 
par. 12; Bradford-Knox & Neighbour 2017, Purcell 2018). This form of Earned recognition falls 
outside the scope of this study. 
Regulating Our Future Project20 
Since February 2016, the FSA has been working to develop a new approach to food regulation 
in the Regulating Our Future programme (ROF). The programme is exploring how third party 
                                                     
19  https://www.food.gov.uk/business-guidance/earned-recognition-approved-assurance-schemes 
(consulted 15-10-2018). Moreover, FSA Northern Ireland approved of Northern Ireland Beef & 
Lamb Farm Quality Assurance Scheme and FSA Wales approved Welsh Lamb and Beef Producers 
Ltd. 
20  Largely literal text taken from FSA 2017. 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2018/01 
 
 
91 
data and information on compliance with assurance scheme standards could be used to 
inform official control activity. FSA is moving away from the term Earned Recognition (ER) 
towards Regulated Private Assurance (Robinson 2017, 4); an approach that will set guidelines 
for competent authorities to recognise the value of a private standard by utilising information 
on compliance with that standard. The aspiration is that this will enable regulators  to make 
better use of data from industry assurance activities such as audits by second and third 
parties and internal controls alongside official controls to inform the nature, frequency and 
intensity of these controls.  
FSA is thinking of a layered system of controls as shown in the assurance hierarchy triangle.   
 
 
(Purcell 2018, p. 5) 
 
The pyramid shows three tiers of oversight. In the first tier, official controls and regulated 
private assurance verify compliance with regulations and a robust system of industry safety 
controls. In the second tier of oversight, the Central Competent Authority FSA verifies that 
official controls and regulated private assurance deliver what they are supposed to do and 
intervenes where they are not. The third tier is an internal or external audit of the functioning 
of the oversight system. 
FSA will set guidelines to be confident that where information on compliance with private 
standards is used to inform official controls, the standards, independence and trust-
worthiness meet their expectations.  Currently, FSA is exploring how compliance with BRC 
could inform official controls. Moreover, FSA is working with GFSI in comparing GFSI 
benchmark standards with EU food safety legislation to see what information might be useful 
to inform official controls (Purcell 2018). The use of information on compliance with private 
standards will not replace official controls.  
FSA had also considered the introduction of Certified Regulatory Auditors (CRA). These 
auditors would be people working in the private sector, who would be certified as meeting 
competency standards set by the FSA. Their evidence of business assurance would be official 
in nature. Balancing the potential benefits against the resource investment required, the FSA 
Board had concluded that development of the CRA role was not a priority (Board meeting 
December 2017). The introduction of Certified Regulatory Auditors is no longer being 
perused. 
The Regulating Our Future Project is an open and transparent process and includes 
consultations with all sorts of stakeholders, local authorities, food industry, private assurance 
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scheme owners, certification bodies, consumers organizations, politicians, citizens and 
academics. The proposals not only lead to positive feedback, there is also criticism (see for 
example Com/otion 2017, Millstone & Lang 2018).21 
Details about the situation after Brexit are still unknown. However, leaving the EU does not 
change FSA’s top priority which is to ensure that UK food remains safe and what it says it is. 
FSA does not anticipate major substantial changes in food legislation (although references to 
EU laws have to be replaced by UK law, and EU functions such as risk assessment have to be 
taken over). 
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Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2018/01 
 
 
93 
Purcell, Nina (2018) Regulating our Future: Assurance framework on Primary Authority 
National Inspection Strategies and next steps on Regulated Private Assurance, Food 
Standards Agency Board meeting 19th September 2018 
Robinson, Yvonne  (2017) Summary report of the pilot project on the potential for recognition 
of the BRC Global Standard for Food Safety, September 2017 
Website FSA https://www.food.gov.uk/  
 
Answers questionnaire 
Interview 
Additional information provided by FSA on request 
  
Havinga: Integration of private certification in governmental food controls 
 
 
94 
UNITED STATES 
 
Food Safety Legislation 
The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) is transforming the food safety system in the US 
by shifting the focus from responding to foodborne illness to preventing it. Ensuring the 
safety of the food supply is a shared responsibility among many different points in the global 
supply chain for both human and animal food. The FSMA rules are designed to make clear 
specific actions that must be taken at each of these points to prevent contamination.  FSMA 
directs FDA to establish standards for adoption of modern food safety prevention practices 
by those who grow, process, transport, and store food. Based on these standards, domestic 
and foreign food facilities that are required to register with FDA are generally required to 
implement a hazard analysis and risk-based preventive control plan. FDA is responsible for 
enforcing food laws which are designed to protect consumers' health and safety. This 
summary does not provide an overview of the food safety regulatory system in the US, it 
focusses exclusively on the role of third party certification and private assurance schemes. 
Reliable third-party audits to verify compliance is one of the tools in FDA’s expanded 
oversight-toolkit. Most of the text in this summary is literally taken from the FDA website.  
Accredited Third-Party Certification22 
FSMA directed FDA to establish a voluntary Accredited Third-Party Certification program for 
the accreditation of third-party certification bodies, also known as third-party auditors, to 
conduct food safety audits and issue certifications of foreign entities and the foods for 
humans and animals they produce. An accreditation body recognized by FDA under this 
program could be a foreign government/agency or a private third party. Certifications may 
be used by importers to help establish eligibility for participation in the Voluntary Qualified 
Importer Program (VQIP), which offers expedited review entry of food. To prevent potentially 
harmful food from reaching U.S. consumers, the FDA may also require in specific 
circumstances that a food offered for import be accompanied by a certification from an 
accredited third-party certification body under FDA’s third-party program or from a pre-
determined foreign government agency. FDA does not accept certification against private 
assurance standards, imported foods need to be audited against applicable food safety 
requirements of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and FDA regulations. 
The Accredited Third-Party Certification program establishes the framework, procedures and 
requirements for accreditation bodies seeking recognition by the FDA, as well as 
requirements for third-party certification bodies seeking accreditation. The FDA will closely 
monitor participants in the program and may revoke an accreditation body’s recognition or 
withdraw a certification body’s accreditation under certain circumstances. FDA may also 
refuse to accept a facility or food certification issued under this program if it determines that 
such certificate is not valid or reliable.  Under this program, the actual assessment of 
certification bodies and monitoring their performance is the responsibility of accreditation 
bodies recognised by FDA under the program. Third-party certification bodies accredited 
under this program are required to perform unannounced food safety audits against 
                                                     
22  https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm361903.htm (consulted 13-11-
2018). On its website the FDA provides translations of this fact sheet on this program in 12 foreign 
languages. 
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applicable food safety requirements of the FD&C Act and FDA regulations and to notify the 
FDA upon discovering a condition that could cause or contribute to a serious risk to the public 
health. On its website, FDA provides a list of recognised accreditation bodies and a list of 
accredited third-party certification bodies.23 
Foreign Supplier Verification Programs (FSVP)  
Under FSMA, those that import food have a responsibility to ensure that their suppliers 
produce food that meets U.S. safety standards. In addition to FDA’s activities for detecting 
and stopping food safety problems at the border, FSMA requires importers covered under 
the FSVP rule to provide documented assurances that their foreign suppliers are meeting FDA 
safety standards. The final rule provides importers flexibility in determining appropriate 
verification measures based on food and supplier risks. Those activities may include 
reviewing food safety records, sampling and testing, or an audit of the supplier.  For the most 
serious hazards controlled by the foreign supplier, the default verification activity is an annual 
onsite audit, although there is flexibility to demonstrate that other activities may be 
appropriate.  If an audit is chosen as the verification activity under the FSVP rule or the supply 
chains provisions of the Preventive Controls rules, those audits must be done by a “qualified 
auditor” and consider applicable FDA food safety regulations. While an importer may use an 
auditor accredited under FDA’s Accredited Third-Party Certification program to conduct such 
food safety audits, it is not required so long as the auditor is qualified through training, 
education, and/or experience to conduct the audit and the audit considers FDA food safety 
standards.  FDA will evaluate whether such audits or certifications meet the required 
standards during inspections of the FSVP importer. 
Voluntary Qualified Importer Program (VQIP)24 
The Voluntary Qualified Importer Program (VQIP) is a new voluntary fee-based program that 
provides expedited review and import entry of human and animal foods into the United 
States for participating importers. Participating importers will be able to import their 
products to the U.S. with greater speed and predictability, avoiding unexpected delays or 
additional time due to normal FDA review procedures at the port of entry, including routine 
examination and sampling. Importers must meet several eligibility criteria to participate in 
the program. One of the criteria is a current facility certification issued under FDA’s 
Accredited Third-Party Certification program for each foreign supplier of food intended for 
importation under VQIP.  In the case of raw produce, there must be a certification for the 
farm under FDA’s produce safety requirements. Applications can be submitted annually 
during the application period from January to May. FDA will conduct a VQIP inspection to 
verify that the importer has fully implemented the food safety and food defense systems 
established in its Quality Assurance Program. 
Private Assurance Schemes 
As mentioned above, all audits for FDA’s programs must be conducted to demonstrate that 
foreign facilities are meeting FDA safety standards, not private standards. Some private 
                                                     
23  https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/ImportsExports/Importing/ucm594398.htm 
and https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/ImportsExports/Importing/ucm618978. 
htm. The program is rather new, October 2018 only three accreditation bodies were recognized 
by FDA and one certification body was accredited under this program. 
24  https://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/fsma/ucm361902.htm  
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assurance schemes want to align with FDA’s safety standards and some 
schemes/certification programs claim to offer an audit against certain FDA food safety 
standards as an addendum. Other private food assurance schemes have approached FDA 
wanting the agency to evaluate whether their requirements are aligned with FDA standards. 
However, FDA has not yet evaluated and determined that any private standards are aligned.  
FDA has also noted that, even if standards are aligned, documentation that the auditor is 
qualified to conduct the audit is essential as well. 
With respect to government audit programs, FDA has informed the Leafy Green Marketing 
Agreements (LGMA) in the U.S. that their system is aligned with the agency’s Produce Safety 
Rule promulgated under FSMA. LGMA is a quasi-governmental program for verifying through 
mandatory government audits that farmers follow accepted food safety practices for lettuce, 
spinach and other leafy greens. In addition, the FDA and the USDA have announced the 
alignment of the USDA Harmonized Good Agricultural Practices Audit Program (USDA H-GAP) 
with the requirements of the FDA FSMA’s Produce Safety Rule. 
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Abstract 
Modern food governance is increasingly hybrid, involving not only government, but 
also industry and – to a lesser extent- civil society actors. In recent years we have 
observed new emerging relationships between public enforcement authorities and 
private food safety assurance schemes. A global survey of governmental food 
authorities (summer 2017) reveals that food authorities in thirteen countries take 
private food safety assurance schemes into account in their inspection policy, 27 do 
not. In this paper I discuss why countries do (not) collaborate with private 
certification programs and how they collaborate with private systems. Finally, the 
consequences will be discussed of incorporating private controls in governmental 
monitoring and enforcement policy. The integration of private certification in official 
controls could be a win-win situation for both parties as it adds up the capacities of 
both systems. Both public food agencies and private food programs could very well 
use the resources available to the other party. However, there are some potential 
risks. From a public interest perspective, the risks can be roughly divided into four 
categories: conflicts of interest, the capacity of private actors to perform adequate 
controls, the willingness of private actors to adequate control, and regulatory 
capture. Arguably, the role of public authorities will shift from direct inspections 
towards system controls and meta regulation. This may have an impact on the 
accountability and legitimacy of governmental food authorities. 
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